"We can't have acquittals, we've got to have convictions." It would be interesting to examine the specific rewards, incentives, inducements, and other consideration to support this objective. This apparent policy may explain some of the alleged misconduct by DoD, DoJ, and CIA personnel in re POW treatment: Securing evidence, however unreliable, through illegal POW abuse to achieve this 100% conviction goal; denying POWs a chance to challenge unreliable evidence in case files; and denial of counsel to have unfettered access to POWs.

Geneva requires POWs to be afforded the same rights during trial as similarly situated personnel under a comparable system of justice, those which US service Members are afforded under the UCMJ. It's allegedly a war crime to provide a valuable benefit or consideration or communicate a threat against personnel attempting to fully enforce the laws of war. Arguably, war crimes issues arise when there is a stated policy to achieve 100% conviction rates using tainted, fabricated, or unreliable evidence, especially if there is no chance for the POWs to challenge that evidence.

It remains to be understood to what extent DoJ, DoD, or CIA legal counsel were attached with allegedly frivolous legal arguments justifying this implied policy of 100% conviction rates. Legal counsel making frivolous arguments to "justify" subsequent POW abuse during trial can attack legal counsel to the original war crimes committed against the POWs. Despite legal duties to fully enforce the laws of war, it's a serious breach of Geneva when legal counsel are promised in exchange for their alleged support for illegal war crimes full legal defenses before international tribunals.

- Which JAGS, who raised concerns with this 100% conviction goal, were scapegoated as being "behind the times" by OVP or current/former WH counsel; to what extent were JAG's concerns raised at the POW working group meetings sidelined because they raised valid concerns that the 100% conviction goal, and the foreseeable POW abuses required to achieve this conviction goal were not consistent with Geneva?

- How were the InfraGard intelligence files adjusted to target US persons who raised concerns about illegal POW mistreatment to achieve this 100% conviction goal; were US persons added to any DHS-InfraGard watch lists for challenging alleged war crimes required to achieve this 100% conviction rate?

- To what extent is this "100 conviction goal" behind the US government's warrantless surveillance: Bypassing the court to secure evidence, regardless whether that information was or wasn't lawfully obtained?

- To achieve this 100% conviction goal, did the US government attempt to hide other POWs using rendition and never try them; were most POWs never changed with crimes because they would, if charged, affect this 100% conv8iction goal; which trials were planned in secret not to protect a national security interest or state secret, but to hide cases where there is no conviction?

- What is the relationship between [a] this goal of achieving 100% conviction rate and the alleged subsequent war crimes committed against POWs to support this policy; and [b] language within the Military Commissions Act, providing full legal defense costs when US personnel appear as defendants before international tribunals for their alleged misconduct in achieving this 100% conviction goal;

- Was the MCA updated to provide legal defense funds to US persons appearing before international tribunals with full knowledge there had been subsequent illegal conduct by DoJ, CIA, and DoD staff counsel that would attach legal counsel to the original war crimes, and alleged misconduct to achieve this 100% conviction rate; what review did Congress make of these subsequent war crimes before approving language within the MCA providing defense funds?

- What review have the relevant attorney disciplinary investigators given to this alleged misconduct by DoD, CIA, and DoJ staff counsel on issues of the laws of war; have these subjects been adequately investigated, or have they been inappropriately rejected as investigations into staff counsel legal memoranda?

- What were the perceived, real, or overtly stated threats, rewards, or benefits communicated to those involved with this program to achieve this 100% conviction rate?

- Where are copies of the policy memos, emails, and other communications expressing implied or overt threats of CIA, DoD, or DoJ staff counsel who raised concerns with these 100% conviction rates to the media, Members of Congress, or the public?

- When did Congress first learn from DoD, DoJ, or CIA officials about the 100% conviction rate; or were CIA, DoD, and DoJ officials threatened or dissuaded from reporting their concerns to entities like DoJ OPR, CIA-DoD-DoJ IG, or the appropriate Congressional Staffs?

- How long have the inspector General's known about this alleged misconduct to achieve this high conviction rate?

- How does the FBI role in "evidence scrubbing" fit into these plans to achieve these conviction goals: Removing evidence that had been gleaned from torture; how long have DoD, CIA, and DoJ officials known about this problem with evidence gleaned using illegal prisoner abuse, a war crime ?

- What evidence has the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, Senate Intelligence Committee, or the House/Senate Judiciary/Armed Services Committee been provided related to these 100% conviction goals [Memos, IG reports, letters to/from Members of Congress]?

- What conduct did the DoD, CIA, DoJ justify as warranted, despite its illegality under Geneva, to achieve the stated conviction rate, 100%?

- Were any DoD, DOJ, CIA officials threatened with job loss, demotion, loss of training, or other valuable things necessary for promotion for raising concerns about the alleged breaches of Geneva, or the alleged misconduct required to support these 100% conviction rates?

- To what extent were DoD, CIA, DoJ officials rewarded for turning a blind eye to injustice, and engaging in official misconduct, or illegally support US policies that breached Geneva in re falsifying evidence, confronting witnesses, or use illegally obtained evidence to secure convictions?

- What were the perceived incentives to fabricate evidence, make frivolous accusations, or divert attention from US government misconduct to achieve this conviction goal?

- What conduct by the US, as a detaining power, would have breached the Geneva protections afforded to POWs: How were POWs substantially deprived of rights afforded to US military personnel under the UCMJ?

- To what extent would the appearance of injustice substantially undermine US combat objectives, and mobilize foreign forces to mobilize in response to US alleged violations of Geneva in prosecuting these POWs at 100% conviction rate?

- Is it the policy of DoD to hide case files from POW-defendants to achieve this 100% conviction rate, when those case files are empty, full of false evidence, or used to prosecute without giving POW defendants to examine that evidence during cross examination?

- To what extent has 'state secrets'-claims been abused as a pretext to prevent POW legal counsel from getting access to evidence that the POW's case files were full of unreliable information which they cannot challenge; to what extent has this claim of privilege been abused to achieve this 100% conviction goal; what is the plan of defense counsel to request the court not recognize this privilege claim because it has been allegedly abused, causing substantial injustice to the POW defendants?

Not to sidetrack this thread with a comment that might be more appropriate to Election Central, but it is people like Col Morris who account for the ironic fact that the Bush administration has made some of us LESS strictly partisan than we were before.

I don't know for certain that Col Morris is a Republican, but prosecutors generally are and I would guess that officers in the military disproportionatly are. Here is a guy who was very much part of the system, a beneficee of the system, and a true believer in the system of justice at guantanamo. What made him finally take a stand against that system? The realization that the system was unfairly rigged in his favor and a sense of justice that transcended loyalty to the commander in chief or even his own career. One can criticize him for ever participating in the Guantanamo trials, but without courageous (probable) Republicans like Morris, Comey, Goldsmith, etc. we would not know as much of the full extent of the crimes of this administration.

On another note, I noticed this line in the AP story:

It is not clear whether the Pentagon — which defends the commission system as fair — will allow Davis to testify. In December, two months after he resigned as the chief prosecutor for the Guantanamo war crimes tribunals, the Defense Department barred Davis from appearing before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee.

It seems startling that they might be able to prevent this from the pentagon (as opposed to the judge preventing it). Then again, it seemed shocking that he could be barred from testifying from the Senate Judiciary subcommittee, which I also thought was illegal. Anybody know if there is anything in the MCA or US law in general that would prevent such pentagon interference?

At last, the insiders who are disgusted are coming forward. Risking one's career and reputation is never easy, but I wish they had come forward much earlier. It does seem, however that the dike has been breached and the crack is getting larger every day.

There's another aspect to this, as erported today:

"Justice Department officials said the O.P.R. inquiry began more than three years ago and noted that it was mentioned in a little-noticed Newsweek article in December 2004."

Has DOJ OPR contacted JAGs like COl Davis for their input on how DOJ OLC, when drafting these memoranda, ignored JAG input at the POW working group meetings?

The Colonel should be on the promotion list for Brig. General when Obama is president, if he (hopefully) is still in the service.

My fear is that, if the administration cannot find some compliant judge to block Col. Davis's testimony, that they will resort to extra-legal means to prevent it. By this, do I mean threats, blackmail and whisking him away to an undisclosed location (kind of like a bizarro witness protection program) where he will be like Patrick McGoohan in "The Prisoner"? You betcha!

It will be a small victory for sanity if he is allowed to speak.