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Another Faustian Swap: Indianapolis Water Authority Forced To Cough Up $100 Million-Plus

Another day, another group of American taxpayers forced to cough up tens of millions of dollars to Wall Street over a little-noticed provision in a "swap" contract gone sour. Last week we brought you the parallel tales of sudden budgetary meltdown in Tennessee, Alabama, Illinois, New Mexico and Philadelphia that in part prompted the credit rating agency Moody's to issue a blanket negative credit outlook on all bonds issued by American cities and towns. Today it's the Indianapolis Water Authority being screwed in a swap deal that might force the utility -- and by extension, its customers -- to cough up a collateral call of as much as $100 million.

The deal is a familiar one: in 2005 the city of Indianapolis refinanced $550 million in fixed-rate bonds to raise money to fund its acquisition of its old water company from the private utility company NiSource, which agreed to sell it as a condition of regulatory approval of its merger with Columbia Energy Group. The deal involved the ailing bond insurer MBIA as well as a similar German-Irish firm called Depfa Bank, which insure the utility's ability to pay up by writing credit default swaps on municipal bonds that protect investors in the event of default. But as Barney Frank pointed out last week, the risk of municipal bonds defaulting is historically minimal -- while the risk that MBIA and Depfa might default was steadily rising as they began to chase the riskier (AIG-dominated) business of writing swaps on collateralized debt obligations. And when those "insurers" started to see their credit downgraded last year, suddenly it was municipalities like Indianapolis that were swamped with calls demanding collateral -- which translates to a major refinancing being funded by an emergency 17.5% rate hike this summer.

If you're having trouble getting your head around how this works, it's a little like this: in order to get a cheaper interest rate on your mortgage, you pay you bank extra for a "swap" insuring the investors who buy the mortgage in the case of your default. But then the bank that originated the mortgage starts making riskier loans and its credit rating agencies downgrade its debt, it turns out the owner of your mortgage can demand collateral from you. Except in the case of municipal bonds, the homeowners are cities and towns with the legal authority to tax citizens and an infintessimal record of actually defaulting -- and the banks were using your interest payments to extend home loans to unemployed high school dropouts and senile 80-year-olds living on Social Security.

Cities and states got suckered into these deals through a mixture of corruption and incompetence. In Tennessee, it appears to be the former; in Illinois, where former Gov. Rod Blagojevich has been charged with taking a cut of an $809,000 fee Bear Stearns paid a lobbyist for steering it the lead underwriter position in a 2003 swap deal, an elaborate conspiracy of corrupt public officials allegedly enabled such transactions.

No official corruption investigation into the Indianapolis deals has yet been announced, but a blog that has been following the deals depicts a typically cozy clique of bond lawyers, bankers and accountants surrounding the city's Bond Bank. This paragraph in particular jumped out at us:

. And just for the fun of it, it's worth noting that the person Mayor Ballard named as executive director of the Bond Bank is Kevin Taylor, who joined city government after leaving AIG's Global Investment Group. Yes, that's the same AIG of mega-government bailout fame. AIG's entry into the business of bond default insurance contributed to its financial mess. You just can't make up stuff this good.
And while enough newspapers are still in business to bring you the tale of a new city, state, school district or park authority getting screwed every day by the same unregulated swaps that begat the crisis, why would you bother?


19 Comments

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This sort of financial comedy/tragedy could not happen in New York State, not anymore, not on the local government level, because the State very strictly limits the kinds of investment vehicles that local governments can use. Plain vanilla financing only, and only with banks and investment houses and advisers that are located within the state and operate under the supervision of the State government. And the NY State Comptroller's Office enforces these limits by auditing the local governments, and making sure that everyone in the State connected with municipal financing and banking knows the rules and the prohibitions. Other states in the union would do themselves a favor by taking close note of just how New York manages this, and adopting the same rules and controls.

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Found it interesting that in Jan 2009, some of the Regions/Morgan Keagan (Tenn/Ala) work was turned over to Pioneers Invest Mgt USA Inc.

Pioneers is the parent of Vanderbilt Capital Advisors, one of the outfits involved in the New Mexico fiasco.

The CEO of Pioneers is Daniel K Kingsbury, who also just happens to be from AIG.

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Um, this isn't a credit default swap, it's an interest rate swap. They're entirely different products.

Did you even read the article? It never once mentions credit default swaps.

Maybe it's time TPM gets a reporter with some basic financial markets literacy. Just a thought.

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Um, credit default swaps is mentioned in the article. Did you read it? I read the article — and no one in the comments mentioned it. So who is the "you" in "Did you even read the article?"

But before you answer: Instead of getting testy after a couple of drinks and a bad day at AIG, why don't you offer a better, entirely more succinct synopsis than this post offered. Since you're obviously equipped with so much universally lacking "basic financial markets literacy," why don't you fill us in? 'Splain the difference between a Credit Default Swap and an Interest Rate Swap in language that us after-work showering thugs can understand, so we can understand the subtle differences into where our trillions are going?

If you could then explain how paying for the bail-out of these market manipulating mafiosi benefits us aforementioned thugs, that would be a real bonus to the great unwashed. I'm sure your wisdom and basic financial markets literacy can make us feel truly un-fucked.

You be d'man, EOC.

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An interest rate swap is when you swap your interest rate with another party's interest rate. Usually its done by swaping a fixed interest rate with floating interest rate. The float interest rate could go up or it could go down, the fixed rate is fixed. Typically the market for these swaps is very liquid, and the Water Authority would be able to switch from floating to fixed if they sensed things were getting too risky. The Indy Water Authority made the unfortunate choice of swapping interest rates with ... Bear Sterns!

A credit default swap is completely different. It is basically an insurance against a default. The buyer of the CDS in theory (but not really in practice) would be the buyer of the debt who wants to insure against the debtor defaulting on payments. So they pay the insurer (AIG) a small fee as insurance against a default. If a default happens then AIG pays them out. Or it can be setup between a person who has nothing to do with the debt and a non-insurance agency (like AIG :)).

So you see CDS is to an Interest rate swap what a boat is to a car. Sure boats and cars are forms of transportation, but they are completely different. And sure interest rate swaps and CDS's are financial instruments used to transfer risk, but they are completely different.

There are many municipalities out there who have been f-ed over by CDS', but the Indy Water Authority is not an example.

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Thanks, I5k. I appreciate your energy on the explanations, but the question I wanted EOC to answer was this: Explain to me, the after-shower set, how bailing out the market manipulating mafiosi is good for me. All of this, as I see it, is merely a last ditch effort to complete the greatest redistribution of wealth in the history of the world.

Understanding the ins and outs of the financial trades is all fine. But understanding the machinations of the theft, and exposing it, is what will ultimately be considered "dandy."

I'm pretty confidant that we after-work-showering spawn feel pretty, I'll say it, Fucked by all of this. Unfortunately, we don't all possess, as EOC said, "basic financial markets literacy" — we don't have time. We have jobs, families, weird financial obligations like rent, food, etc. Thankfully, we don't have to worry about those pesky million-dollar bonuses, er, retention thangies. Ah, we'd never understand them.

Sorry for venting, I5k. Thanks for the education.

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Yes the "after-shower" crowd is not expected to possess all that knowledge, just like the "before-shower" crowd knows jack about fixing their car, plumbing, electrical work, or anything else really. What you have to understand here is that it wasn't some sucker at the Indy Water Authority who signed onto this deal. The $435 million in variable-rate debt represents 58 percent of its overall debt, so that means they have $750,000,000 in debt. When you have that kind of debt to deal with you should hire someone who knows what the eff they are doing, unfortunately they did not.

"There was risk, but it seemed worth it," said Barbara Lawrence, who was director of the Bond Bank at the time. "Barring some event such as what we've seen, it seemed like a prudent decision."

Hoping to guard against the unexpected, the Bond Bank decided to limit its risk by entering into swaps involving Bear Stearns and other New York City financial firms. Bear Stearns has since collapsed.

I think the fault lies with the director of the Bond Bank at the time. She thought she was this big player making these complex financial instrument bets. She forgot what her job was, and she gambled other peoples $$. She thought she was working for an investment bank with high risk tolerance, and not for a municipal water authority with very low risk tolerance. I'm sorry that the people of Indy are getting screwed by this, but the only people they should blame are the people who worked for them and should have known better. When you manage $750 mill in debt you really should know what your getting into - the potential rewards AND the potential risks. This isn't an "after-shower" guy making a decision about an ARM on his house, no this is a "before-shower" gal making the decision.

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i5kfun:

Can you also explain what happens if the Water Authority defaults on this debt? Especially considering that they are covered by default insurance.

Also, for a $750 million debt to require a $100 million payment (13 1/3 %) seems a trifle excessive.

It seems rather odd that the Federal Government is bailing out the banks and financial institutions who wrote these debts without bailing out the organizations which were conned into assuming these same debts. The financial indtitutions seem to have the best of both words - they have the bailout money and retain the debts owed to them.
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Please point to where credit default swaps are mentioned in the Indianapolis Star article that Tkacik got this story from.

Can't find it? That's because credit default swaps are in no way involved in this story.

Credit default swaps hedge default risks. Interest rate swaps hedge -- not surprisingly -- interest rate risks (i.e., the risk that interest rates will move against you). Monoline insurers never insure municipal bonds with credit default swaps. They write "wraps" on muni bonds, which are similar to CDS, but still a fundamentally different product.

And yes, before a journalist accuses a bank of "screwing" innocent and good-hearted taxpayers on "Main Street," and implying corruption by the bank, I expect the journalist to know the difference between credit default swaps and interest rate swaps. If you don't understand how the transaction actually worked, then you shouldn't be publishing articles about it. Period.

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Thanks for sharing, EOC.

Despite my obvious penchant for prescience, I never saw you coming back.

Your knowledge of the subject, not to mention your seeming hostility all around, suggests that you have a vested interest. Period.

Don't blame the messenger. You have the knowledge. Do tell. Write it out, my friend. Give them journalists hell!

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So, unless a reporter has an MBA with a concentration in finance from an Ivy League school, they shouldn't be allowed to inform citizens that hundreds of millions of dollars of their tax money is being sacrificed becuase of an incestuous relationship between banks and the financial managers of quasi-public utilities?

Why don't you save your outrage over financial ingnorance for the individuals resposible for these fiascos?

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Well yes it would be nice for reporters to know what they are talking about for a change.

And it wasn't an incestuous relationship that caused this mess, it was 2 factors.

Factor 1: The bond manager hired by the Indy Water Authority allocated too high a % of their bonds to variable interest rate floats, ie the manager exposed the authority to too much risk.

Factor 2: The credit market seized up last year, which made it infeasible for the Indy Water Authority to switch that ~$500 million in debt from variable to fixed interest rate when interest rates started to rise.

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Hey guys: sorry, I was trying to make it easier to understand. Bond insurance and credit default swaps are effectively the same thing for our purposes.

TPM would never let me write a post long enough to fully explain these interest rate swap transactions. But one day I'll lay it down in the comments. It's a lot more complicated than my analogy explained -- and not surprisingly, involves a lot more fees for the Wall Street banks.

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The important question, it seems, is where the collateral call came from. It's one thing to do an interest-rate swap with someone who has a variable rate and get caught holding the bag on a much higher rather than you thought, but that doesn't seem likely to result in a $100-mil jump on a $500-mil loan. The collateral call comes (it seems) when the folks you swapped with are about to go belly-up and walk away with some other investor's money, and for the saving of some piddly fraction of a percent on interest you are now responsible, in effect, for repaying the loan you swapped out as well as the one you swapped in.

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Just curious.

Why can't the state of Indiana set up a State Bank of Indiana, borrow $1 Billion from the Federal Reserve Bank at the going rate, loan the Indy Water Authority $750 Million at 1% above the Federal Reserve interest rate so the Water Authority can pay off this high interest loan?

From some of these posts it sounds like this loan is currently in the 10%+ interest range.

Everyone involved would benefit, the new State Bank of Indiana would profit by $7.5 Million in the first year and by lesser amounts in future years as the loan is paid off.

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There is no reason to label every complex financial instrument a Credit Default Swap.

The reason Indy is being f'ed is because they did an interest rate swap - it is not because of the reason that you describe in this article. When the credit markets froze up last year the interest rates shot up, and now to get out of that deal, and avoid paying an extra $20-40 million a year in interest, Indy will be forced to cough up $100 million.

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Interest rates shot up?

They are lower now than they have been for the past many, many years.

Something doesn't make sense here.

Especially since the Federal Reserve Discount Rate is now at 1/2 of 1%.

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Moe,

The point is that credit default swaps had nothing to do with this transaction. Nothing. That makes the article inaccurate, and wildly misleading. Why would you mention the historically low default rates of municipalities if the transaction didn't involve wraps or credit default swaps? Interest-rate swaps don't hedge default risk, so that data is irrelevant.

I'd just like you to get the basic facts right before you accuse a bank of "screwing" an oh-so-pure municipality. If you don't understand the transaction, then how could you possibly know whether the bank actually was "screwing" the municipality?

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Moe, this is excellent work you are doing. Keep it coming. The devil is hidden in the contracts.

The truth is most of us are fools still in denial. The FAT CATS know this as they continue to play most for all their worth. Those who measure their worth by dollars and cents have their reward. Those who claim to be public servants while still buying the B.S. some street friend is selling them may find their stay in Washington VERY SHORT.

http://tw5.us/DJ

Reporting the story may not pay much but you may find a few friends who value your efforts. Those friendships are worth what you make of them. To me they're regarded as priceless. http://tw5.us/DI


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