A headline rewrite might be in order: According to that chart, the highest ratio (so far) of thugs to troops occurred last December.

And what happened in spring '08 to lower the hired-gun count?

First, it seems none or almost none are 'engaging the enemy' (tiowally, that's what a mercenary would do). 76% are locals, isn't that a good thing?

Having said that, I DO believe creeping privatization, even in non-combat roles, presents a host of problems.

1)Cost. In order to attract civilians to a theater of war, especially foreign civilians, salaries must be attractive. Conversley, offering to 'pay for college, for a young US resident recruit to work in a non-combat role is cheaper and eventually gives the country one more college-educated person.

2)Control. When/if things get hairy, private firms always have the option to pull out as was evidenced by many contractors in Iraq. A US soldier has no authority over the private contractor, this sows conflict and hurts morale. Disparity of income (see above) is large and growing. It just feels better when the cafeteria worker/mechanic/DJ,etc. is also a soldier.

3)Belligerent core. What's this? Well, as the DoD distills the military to fighters and only fighters, it will lead to a loss of the already tenuous 'sense of community' with the surrounding civilian population whether at home or abroad. Non-combat troops can 'soften' the militaries overall in country profile through the relationships they build with their fellow troops and the civilian community, sort of unofficial liaisons.

4)Erosion of highly skilled specialists. Why saty in the Army/Navy/Marines spec ops if they've trained you and you've finished your hitch and some private contractor is waving a six figure salary under your nose?

The chart indicates that the number of contractors in Afghanistan ramped up substantially in the final six months of Bush's term. One wonders if this was a last flush of contractual favors to Bush-friendly companies.