General Lute said on Monday we'll negotiate them. Ali al-Dabbagh wouldn't rule them out. But at the White House press gaggle today, Dana Perino denied the Bush administration's interest in long-term U.S. military bases in Iraq. From AFP:
"We do not seek permanent bases in Iraq," spokeswoman Dana Perino told reporters after Lieutenant General Douglas Lute said Monday that the flashpoint issue would be part of negotiations to decide the future of US troops in Iraq.
Yawn. This standard formulation is nothing new for the administration. Zalmay Khalilzad, for instance, used the same words as far back as 2005, and the Iraq Study Group still considered the statement less than categorical. After all: what would we do if Iraq just happened to offer us open-ended access to certain military installations, or access renewable in x-number of years? Very, very rarely will a host country deny the U.S. a re-up on a military base: it took the Philippines nearly 100 years to get us out of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base.
There's a sense in which our presence at those bases wasn't "permanent," and another in which we didn't "seek" permanence. But it's one in which the literal meaning has to be interpreted in direct contradiction to the events and issues those words describe. Luckily, the American Philological Society calls that interpretation a "Perino."
Ali al-Dabbagh doesn't foresee the Iraqi parliament rejecting the upcoming long-term security assurance President Bush intends to extend Iraq. He must not have talked to Saleh Mutlaq.
Mutlaq is the somewhat dyspeptic head of the smaller of two Sunni blocs in parliament. Both blocs exhibit profound distrust for Nouri al-Maliki. But Mutlaq is even less accommodating, and he's closer to the "Sunni extremist" whom Dabbagh expects will object to the deal. Sure enough, Mutlaq objects to the deal.
Via IraqSlogger (sub. req.), Mutlaq told the newspaper Kul al- 'Iraq that the Iraqi people -- meaning his constituency -- would see the deal as "a U.S. imposition." The only way to avoid that perception would be... if the U.S. set a timetable to withdraw from Iraq. That's clearly at cross-purposes with the point of the security deal.
So cross Mutlaq off from the list of the deal's supporters. The question now becomes what kind of coalition Mutlaq can cobble together to stop the deal.
President Bush might not require Congressional approval for the upcoming U.S.-Iraq security agreement. But al-Dabbagh said the Maliki government will need to secure a blessing for the deal from the Iraqi parliament. And even though the deal will cover a U.S. military presence for years to come, Dabbagh doesn't expect any parliamentary turbulence -- let alone refusal.
The final arrangement, which the U.S. expects to reach in July 2008, "definitely needs an approval" from parliament, Dabbagh told TPMmuckraker. That's because Article 58, Section 4 of the Iraqi constitution ensures the parliament must approve "international treaties and agreements by a two-thirds majority."
Jason Sigger of Armchair Generalist asked whether Maliki could get parliamentary approval for a deal perceived to pave the way for an indefinite U.S. presence. After all, in May, 144 of 275 parliamentarians, led by Moqtada al-Sadr's faction, called for a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops. Dabbagh replied that "not only Shia extremists, but also Sunni extremists ... are going to object." But he didn't forsee a problem. "[The] U.S. people should have confidence that the Iraqi people are accepting this without any pressure," he said. "It is their choice to have a lasting agreement."
Ali al-Dabbagh, the official spokesman for the government of Iraq, refused to rule out granting the U.S. military permanent bases in Iraq during next year's negotiations over the shape of a long-term U.S.-Iraq security agreement.
TPMmuckraker had the opportunity to speak with Dabbagh through a blogger conference call set up by the Department of Defense. He declined to speak with any specificity about long-term basing rights for U.S. troops or about Iraq's desired size for a residual U.S. presence. "We are not speaking of permanent bases yet. It is too early to speak of this," he told TPMmuckraker. The level of U.S. troops in Iraq in the future, he said, should be linked to "the status of Iraq's security forces. As long as Iraqi forces are ready, then the number will diminish."
I followed up by asking if the Iraqis would rule out granting the U.S. permanent bases in the upcoming negotiations. He said that discussion on the issue has not begun in Iraq. "This is not an easy issue, having bases here in Iraq," Dabbagh said. "It will be highly debated, but at the end it is a presence. Is it permanent, or for how many years -- five, ten -- this is an issue that is going to be discussed with the political parties," and with the United States, to reach "a common view." He added that "it is very difficult to predict right now, what level of permanence" Iraq will ultimately grant the U.S. military.
Asked by a Pentagon public affairs officer if he had any message for U.S. troops who had served or are still serving in Iraq, Dabbagh replied, "In the end, Iraqis will never forget such sacrifice." That's surely true. After all, that sacrifice isn't going to end.
On Monday, commenting on President Bush's forthcoming long-term security guarantee to Iraq, top White House war adviser Douglas Lute said, "We don't anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress." In other words, Bush can commit the U.S. to protecting the security of Iraq -- including, as Lute said, enduring U.S. bases in Iraq and a residual troop presence -- without Congressional approval. Can he?
"That reflects historical practice," says Peggy McGuinness, a former State Department official and current law professor at the University of Missouri.
To boil down an arcane legal debate to a thick constitutional sauce, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, says that the President can enter into treaties with foreign countries "provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." But not every foreign agreement is what McGuiness calls a "capital-T Treaty." Security guarantees, and particularly garrisoning agreements for U.S. troops abroad -- a category called a Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA -- are not usually treated by the executive branch as capital-T Treaties. Historically, Congress doesn't insist that the executive does, and the Supreme Court has never ruled that all such arrangements require Senate advice and consent. As a result of this historical practice, "a SOFA is usually a purely executive agreement," McGuiness explains.
The reactions to President Bush's forthcoming long-term security guarantees to Iraq just keep on piling in. Here's Jim Manley, spokesman for Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV), the Democratic leader in the Senate. He's reacting in particular to General Lute's statement that Bush doesn't need Congressional buy-in for any security deal with Maliki:
"Nearly six years into the war, the President still fails to understand that 'go-it-alone' is a not a successful strategy. Just as he ignored facts and the world community in getting us into this war and is ignoring the demands of Congress and the American people to get us out, President Bush is now trying to unilaterally negotiate an agreement with Iraq on security -- an area [where] the President has absolutely zero credibility."
Speaking of going it alone, it's worth noting that with the end to the United Nations Security Council mandate for the occupation -- which Maliki heralded in a televised address -- the remaining members of the Coalition of the Willing will no longer have a legal basis for staying in Iraq. After 2008, it's just us and the Iraqis. (And the insurgents. And the Mahdi Army. And the other militias. And whatever al-Qaeda in Iraq remains.)
It may not be the most compelling argument to an Iraqi civilian, but it surely resonates within the private-security industry. One of Blackwater's competitors, the London-based ArmorGroup, anticipates a lackluster quarterly profit report -- something the company blames, in part, on the Iraqi government's hostility to private security contractors after the Nisour Square shootings.
ArmorGroup International PLC, a British private security company, warned Tuesday that profits will fall this year because of the fallout from competitor Blackwater Worldwide's involvement in the shooting deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians.
The news sent the company's share price plunging 40 percent on the London Stock Exchange.
ArmorGroup also announced that David Seaton was stepping down as chief executive, effective immediately, as the company reorganizes.
"The award and mobilization of a number of major contracts in Iraq has been severely affected by the Blackwater incident in Baghdad on 16 September," the company said in a trading update to the London Stock Exchange.
Imagine that: shooting civilians is bad for business.
Yesterday, General Douglas Lute, a top Iraq adviser to President Bush, said that the administration didn't require Senate ratification for its forthcoming long-term security guarantee to the Iraqis. It's unclear whether that's true, and I'll tell you more as soon as I know it. But even if it is, the Iraqi constitution stipulates that Iraq's parliament has to ratify any such agreement. And the Iraqi parliament is a lot more hostile to the idea of hosting U.S. troops indefinitely than the U.S. Senate is.
Take a look at Article 58, Section 4 of the Iraqi constitution. It stipulates that the Iraqi parliament shall ratify "international treaties and agreements by a two-thirds majority." Whether or not President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki can finagle the deal so that it's not a treaty -- as Lute suggested yesterday -- it most certainly is an "agreement."
And it's hard to see the votes for a two-thirds parliamentary majority.
If you're like most Americans and most Iraqis, chances are you think a normal state of affairs between the two nations is not one in which, say, U.S. troops walk the streets of Baghdad. Well, all you've done is prove your unfitness to serve in the Bush administration. Today, the administration has spun the forthcoming permanent U.S. troop presence as amounting to a "normalization" of relations.
[T]his Declaration is the first step in a three-step process that will normalize U.S.-Iraqi relations in a way which is consistent with Iraq's sovereignty and will help Iraq regain its rightful status in the international community – something both we and the Iraqis seek.
And here's National Security Council staffer Brett McGurk:
“It sends a signal to the region … that the United States is committed to Iraq for the long term -- that we’re not packing up and leaving,” McGurk said. “But that nature of our commitment over time will transition, as it should, and that we will have a normalized, bilateral relationship with Iraq.”
Credit the administration with a sudden candor. For the first time in four years, it's admitting that its conception of a normal Iraq is one in which the U.S. military operates there forever and ever and ever. It's not quite 6 p.m. Are there any other conspiracy theories sure to arouse anti-American sentiment in the Middle East that the administration would like to confirm before quitting time?
Here's the full text of the joint Bush-Maliki agreement on principles for a long-term U.S. security commitment to Iraq. There's some hilarious obfuscatorese on the question of bases and troop levels. ("Support will be provided consistent with mechanisms and arrangements to be established in the bilateral cooperation agreements mentioned herein" -- in context, I promise, that translates to "let's worry about defining the U.S. troop presence in the final agreement.") But take a look at this key economics "principle":
Facilitating and encouraging the flow of foreign investments to Iraq, especially American investments, to contribute to the reconstruction and rebuilding of Iraq.
In fairness, it's the job of the U.S. in bilateral negotiations to try to win the most favorable investment environment for American business. But that's not so difficult when your military is keeping your negotiating partners, you know, alive. Already $6 billion worth of Iraq contracts are under criminal review. How much more Iraqi business could flow to Americans? It's hard to say, but it looks like Stuart Bowen will have a long, long career ahead of him.
Whatever rationale the Bush administration cooks up for our soon-to-be-permanent presence in Iraq, chances are it won't compare to Nouri al-Maliki's. Maliki went on Iraqi TV today to say that the joint agreement reached today with President Bush actually means that the U.S. presence in Iraq is... wait for it... coming to an end!
"The United States has promised that the multinational forces will stay under a United Nations mandate only until the end of 2008," Mr Maliki said in a televised address.
"The final extension for the multinational forces under the UN mandate will finish in 2008."
Mr Maliki said Iraq was not a threat to any of its neighbours as it was now a "democratic state".
"It is no longer a danger to the interests of the region. We are saying frankly that there is no justification for Iraq to stay under Chapter VII. All the justification created by the former regime is now over," he said.
Mr Maliki also said that Iraq had reached the stage where it did not need multinational forces and that the country should be allowed to become a "normal state".
Now, given the crippling legacy of U.N. sanctions during the 1990s, the expiration of a U.N. security mandate has an emotional resonance for Iraqis that Maliki is rather cynically exploiting. Left apparently unstated is that after the U.N. mandate expires, Maliki will personally broker a new "justification" for the U.S.'s Mesopotamian excursion. What kind of government blatantly misrepresents to its public the implications of its actions? Why, the kind of government to which we bequeath long-term security guarantees, of course!
Q General, will the White House seek any congressional input on this?
GENERAL LUTE: In the course of negotiations like this, it's not -- it is typical that there will be a dialogue between congressional leaders at the negotiating table, which will be run out of the Department of State. We don't anticipate now that these negotiations will lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the Congress.
Q Is the purpose of avoiding the treaty avoiding congressional input?
GENERAL LUTE: No, as I said, we have about a hundred agreements similar to the one envisioned for the U.S. and Iraq already in place, and the vast majority of those are below the level of a treaty.
Lute said the White House intends to conclude negotiations on an enduring security guarantee with the Maliki government in July. Permanent military bases and residual troop levels will be specified in the final accord, he said.
Oh, for the halcyon days when the Bush administration saw fit to deny that it sought a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. Let's take a look at what senior administration officials said way back when, shall we?
"We do not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. Our goal is to help Iraq stand on its own feet, to be able to look after its own security, and to do what we can to help achieve that goal."
Condoleezza Rice, April 4, 2006, quoted by Agence France-Presse (Via Nexis):
Rice would not say when all U.S. forces would return home and did not directly answer Rep. Steven Rothman, a Democrat, when he asked, "Will the bases be permanent or not?"
"I would think that people would tell you, `We're not seeking permanent bases really pretty much anywhere in the world these days.' We are, in fact, in the process of removing base structure from a lot of places," Rice replied.
So it begins. After years of obfuscation and denial on the length of the U.S.'s stay in Iraq, the White House and the Maliki government have released a joint declaration of "principles" for "friendship and cooperation." Apparently President Bush and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the declaration during a morning teleconference.
Naturally, the declaration is euphemistic, and doesn't refer explicitly to any U.S. military presence.
-- Iraq's leaders have asked for an enduring relationship with America, and we seek an enduring relationship with a democratic Iraq. We are ready to build that relationship in a sustainable way that protects our mutual interests, promotes regional stability, and requires fewer Coalition forces.
-- In response, this Declaration is the first step in a three-step process that will normalize U.S.-Iraqi relations in a way which is consistent with Iraq's sovereignty and will help Iraq regain its rightful status in the international community – something both we and the Iraqis seek. The second step is the renewal of the Multinational Force-Iraq's Chapter VII United Nations mandate for a final year, followed by the third step, the negotiation of the detailed arrangements that will codify our bilateral relationship after the Chapter VII mandate expires.
A "democratic Iraq" here means the Shiite-led Iraqi government. The current political arrangement will receive U.S. military protection against coups or any other internal subversion. That's something the Iraqi government wants desperately: not only is it massively unpopular, even among Iraqi Shiites, but the increasing U.S.-Sunni security cooperation strikes the Shiite government -- with some justification -- as a recipe for a future coup.
What? Permanent U.S. bases in Iraq? I've never heard of anything so absurd! Why, you -- you -- you conspiracy theorist! How can you be so shrill, so irresponsible, so, so, so...
Iraq's government is prepared to offer the U.S. a long-term troop presence in Iraq and preferential treatment for American investments in return for an American guarantee of long-term security including defense against internal coups, The Associated Press learned Monday.
The proposal, described to the AP by two senior officials familiar with the issue, is one of the first indications that the United States and Iraq are beginning to explore what their relationship might look like, once the U.S. significantly draws down its troop presence.
Make no mistake: this is Nouri al-Maliki offering the U.S. a permanent presence in return for guaranteeing the security of his government. (Would-be PM Ayad Allawi can't make President Bush a counteroffer as good as that.) In exchange for a platform for the indefinite projection of American power throughout the Middle East, the Bush Administration probably considers protection for Maliki and his coterie to be a small price to pay. No wonder the negotiation of a mandate for foreign troops in Iraq at the United Nations -- where this deal would begin to take shape -- is one of Bush's new post-benchmark benchmarks.
When last we left the Bush administration's so-called benchmarks for strategic progress in Iraq -- that is, the political progress that military success allows -- they weren't being met, and the White House didn't care. Now that the year's almost over and the administration is beginning to bring the "surge" troops home, it's worth asking: what happened to the benchmarks? The New York Times reports that the administration has quietly given up on them, preferring nebulous goals for which it's easier to claim success.
With American military successes outpacing political gains in Iraq, the Bush administration has lowered its expectation of quickly achieving major steps toward unifying the country, including passage of a long-stymied plan to share oil revenues and holding regional elections.
Instead, administration officials say they are focusing their immediate efforts on several more limited but achievable goals in the hope of convincing Iraqis, foreign governments and Americans that progress is being made toward the political breakthroughs that the military campaign of the past 10 months was supposed to promote.
The short-term American targets include passage of a $48 billion Iraqi budget, something the Iraqis say they are on their way to doing anyway; renewing the United Nations mandate that authorizes an American presence in the country, which the Iraqis have done repeatedly before; and passing legislation to allow thousands of Baath Party members from Saddam Hussein’s era to rejoin the government. A senior Bush administration official described that goal as largely symbolic since rehirings have been quietly taking place already.
In January, the entire point of the surge, according to President Bush, was to achieve sectarian reconciliation. The surge has had quite a few tactical successes, as would be expected with an infusion of 30,000 troops and a smarter, population-centric approach. But that's an unfortunate footnote to a four-plus-year war -- and one susceptible to reversal -- without political progress, as any half-awake counterinsurgency expert can attest. And, once again, the Bush administration has substituted at least some tangible definition of success for what amounts to a PR strategy. Remember this when Bush and the 2008 GOP presidential candidates praise the surge to high heaven and castigate liberals for opposing its manifest, shining wisdom.
Despite the Pittsburgh TV station KDKA citing "thousands" of wounded soldiers being asked to return their recruitment bonuses, it's unclear how many actually were, according to Army spokesman Paul Boyce.
Boyce says he has personally been in touch with the station's reporters as part of the Army's efforts to get to the bottom of the bonus-recoupment story, and he's been able to determine that 300 soldiers were asked to send back part or all of their battlefield pay -- not their bonuses. So far, the Army attributes the mistake to an insufficient number of finance clerks at some hospitals where wounded soldiers were admitted in 2004 and 2005, resulting in paperwork mix-ups. In 99 of those cases, the remittance was waived "on the spot" after the Army caught the error. For the remaining 201, some measure of congressional assistance was required, Boyce said, but for all cases that didn't involve a soldier involved in obvious wrongdoing (a more precise number was unavailable), soldiers kept their money. In response, the Army beefed up their finance personnel at its hospitals, Boyce said.
It remains unclear how many wounded soldiers actually received notices from the Army demanding they return their recruitment bonuses -- or who don't receive installments of those bonuses -- after injuries prevented them from finishing their service commitments. Boyce says the Army is "presently looking into the circumstances" of how many soldiers were asked to send back their bonuses.
After learning from the media that a wounded Iraq veteran, Private First Class Jordan Fox of Pennsylvania, was asked to return his enlistment bonus when an IED prematurely ended his soldiering career, the Army has emphasized that its policy is not to recoup those bonuses. But it doesn't know how the snafu occurred. And that raises concerns that other wounded soldiers might lose their benefits through a different bureaucratic mix-up.
Apropos of Paul's good question on Wednesday about recruitment bonuses -- are they paid up front, allowing them to be partially withheld if soldiers are unable to complete their tours? -- we have an answer. Bonuses are paid incrementally, for the most part, except for military jobs facing a "critical shortfall" of personnel.
That means infantrymen are probably going to get their bonuses on the installment plan, though Army spokesman Paul Boyce -- who has the unfortunate assignment of fielding reporters' calls on the Jordan Fox story post-Thanksgiving -- says that wouldn't "necessarily" be the case. "It depends on the situation for the individual soldier," he explains.
So what percentage of recruitment bonuses are paid up front? Boyce doesn't know, and says that there isn't a system in place for determining that percentage "at this time."
Very well. So couldn't the Army conceivably not pay the remaining installments of a recruitment bonus to a soldier unable to complete his or her tour, as opposed to the current policy of not seeking recoupment?
Yesterday, we noted a story about Iraq veterans who were being asked to return part of their enlistment bonuses because their injuries prevented them from completing their tours. The story focused on one vet in particular, Jordan Fox from Pittsburgh.
Well, the story kicked up something of a firestorm, so Brigadier General Michael Tucker, deputy commanding general of Walter Reed (he was tapped after the scandal broke), showed up on Fox News early this morning.
Reacting to Fox's case, he said, "We're not sure what happened but we're gonna fix it." Here's the clip:
The problem goes far beyond just that one soldier, though. No numbers are available, but the story yesterday quoted estimates by veterans groups that this sort of thing happened to "thousands" of others.
Tucker said that army policy "is that soldiers who are wounded in combat or have line of duty investigation injuries... we will not go after a recoupment of any bonuses they receive." Recouping bonuses, he said, "doesn't pass the common sense test."
But notice that phrasing. While that policy, if implemented, would prevent injured soldiers from having to pay back bonuses they'd already received, they might still not receive their full enlistment bonus. That's because the Army could still withhold parts of the bonus on the basis that the soldiers didn't complete their full tour due to the injury.
Rep. Jason Altmire (D-PA), who introduced a bill last month that would require the Pentagon to pay bonuses to wounded vets in full within 30 days after discharge for combat-related wounds, said he was "heartened" by Tucker's announcement this morning that the Army won't seek repayment of bonuses. He added:
“However, I am disappointed that the policy does not go further by stating that wounded soldiers will also receive the remaining balance of future bonus payments. It is preposterous for our government to have a policy that says that a soldier who has sustained serious injuries in the field of battle has not fulfilled his or her service obligation."
Pentagon rules, Altmire says, prevent enlistees from receiving their full enlistment bonus unless they fulfill their entire military obligation.
Just in time for the holidays, there's a special place in Hell just waiting to be filled by some as-yet-unknown Pentagon bureaucrat. Apparently, thousands of wounded soldiers who served in Iraq are being asked to return part of their enlistment bonuses -- because their injuries prevented them from completing their tours. From Pittsburgh's KDKA:
One of them is Jordan Fox, a young soldier from the South Hills.
He finds solace in the hundreds of boxes he loads onto a truck in Carnegie. In each box is a care package that will be sent to a man or woman serving in Iraq. It was in his name Operation Pittsburgh Pride was started.
Fox was seriously injured when a roadside bomb blew up his vehicle. He was knocked unconscious. His back was injured and lost all vision in his right eye.
A few months later Fox was sent home. His injuries prohibited him from fulfilling three months of his commitment. A few days ago, he received a letter from the military demanding nearly $3,000 of his signing bonus back.
"I tried to do my best and serve my country. I was unfortunately hurt in the process. Now they're telling me they want their money back," he explained.
Perversely, President Bush phoned Fox's mother to ask after Fox in May. Now his administration is taking money out of the pockets of wounded veterans like him.
Back in October, Rep. Jason Altmire (D-PA) introduced a bill, the Veterans Guaranteed Bonus Act, that would require the Pentagon to pay bonuses to wounded vets in full within 30 days after discharge for combat-related wounds. Back then, the Pentagon's flack vaguely assured The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, "We are going to give our wounded warriors and their families what they need to recover and return to duty or private life." But apparently the policy has yet to change. It seems that the enlistment contract that at least some troops sign (whether it's service-specific is unclear) allows for withholding some of the signing bonus if a tour isn't completed. We're in touch with the Pentagon to clear this up, and we'll let you know as soon as we do.
Remember that recently-impaneled grand jury looking at Blackwater's Nisour Square shootings? Turns out it's not just about Blackwater.
Four years into the occupation, prosecutors are attempting to build the first criminal case against private security companies -- who up until now worked in a system rigged to ensure unaccountability.
The Washington grand jury has issued subpoenas to several private security firms, including Blackwater, a legal source briefed on the probe said yesterday. Authorities are seeking company "after-action" reports and other documents that may shed light on specific incidents, he said.
The source, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the probe, declined to say which incidents have been targeted, but he said the investigation ranges well beyond Blackwater. Private security companies in Iraq "have been shooting a lot of people," he said.
There's no word from the piece about which non-Blackwater firms are in the grand jury's crosshairs, nor which incidents are potentially criminal. As the paper reports, the Iraqi government claims it knows more than 20 potential criminal incidents involving private security companies -- most of which it lays at the feet of Blackwater -- but whether that list has anything to do with the grand jury's focus is unknown.
Also unknown is the specific law which the security firms could be accused of breaking:
But the U.S. government's ability to prosecute remains hampered by the lack of clarity over what laws may apply. For instance, contractors were immunized from Iraqi laws under a June 2004 order signed by the U.S. occupation authority. That ruling remains in effect.
In addition, investigations are complicated by questions about evidence, jurisdiction and the availability of witnesses. "If they're going to try to indict, they've got a lot to overcome," said Patricia A. Smith, an Alexandria lawyer who represents two former employees of Triple Canopy, a private security firm based in Herndon, in a civil lawsuit. The former employees say they were wrongfully terminated after reporting that their Triple Canopy team leader fired shots into the windshield of a taxi for amusement last year on Baghdad's airport road.
Apparently The New York Times correctly reported that an as-yet-unfinished FBI investigation into the Nisour Square shootings considers Blackwater to have fired without provocation. ABC News reports that a grand jury in Washington D.C. is considering some kind of indictment for the guard who fired on an Iraqi traffic circle, resulting in 17 dead Iraqis.
A number of Blackwater security guards assigned to the ill-fated convoy have been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury next week.
A Department of Justice spokesperson, Dean Boyd, said, "We do not comment on grand jury investigations."
But sources familiar with the Blackwater case say the guards called to testify were, while present, not those who allegedly fired on any civilians.
According to statements given to State Department diplomatic security agents, obtained by ABCNews.com, only five guards admitted to firing their weapons.
It may be a pale substitute for his old job heading the National Counterterrorism Center, but it's not bad.
Last month, NCTC Director Scott Redd told NBC News that the Iraq war had not "tactically" made the U.S. safer, and acknowledged that it had provided al-Qaeda with a recruiting tool. Mere days later, Redd announced his resignation. Draw your own conclusions.
Now comes word that Redd's ex-boss, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, saw him off with full honors. From a prepared statement:
Director McConnell presented Redd with the award – the highest granted by the DNI – at a Nov. 9 ceremony held in Redd’s honor at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C.
“Scott Redd has devoted his life to serving his nation,” the DNI said at the event, which attracted several other heads of IC agencies, including FBI Director Robert Mueller; CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden; Vice Adm. Robert Murrett, director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and Scott Large, director of the National Reconnaissance Office.
Redd also received at the ceremony other awards from IC partners, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the NGA.
How to get Baghdad cars out of the way of diplomatic motorcades? The old answer -- an escalation of force beginning with thrown water bottles and ending with rifle fire -- clearly isn't in the cards after Nisour Square. So what's left to try?
The State Department is experimenting with an idea to make the Baghdad streets both safe and stylish. Convoy drivers will be fitted with -- yes -- laser helmets able to emit a beam of bright light to blind errant and potentially dangerous motorists.
Security experts say the lasers, emitting a green beam and already in use at some U.S. military checkpoints in Baghdad, overload the optic nerve but, if used from at least 10 feet away, will not cause any permanent eye damage. ...
"I've had them tested on me, and while it is certainly uncomfortable, like a flashbulb going off in front of your face, there is no permanent damage whatsoever," said Tony Diebler, a former State Department security official who now works at Cohort, International, the company providing the lasers and helmet cameras to the State Department.
Huh. A former State Department security official who now sells security equipment to the State Department. I'd say that might be something the inspector general should look at, but, you know....
It's looking grim for Blackwater. Although the FBI hasn't finished its investigation into the September 16 shootings at Nisour Square -- in which 17 Iraqi civilians were killed -- The New York Times reports that the company's guards at the square, by and large, opened fire without provocation:
Federal agents investigating the Sept. 16 episode in which Blackwater security personnel shot and killed 17 Iraqi civilians have found that at least 14 of the shootings were unjustified and violated deadly-force rules in effect for security contractors in Iraq, according to civilian and military officials briefed on the case....
Investigators have concluded that as many as five of the company’s guards opened fire during the shootings, at least some with automatic weapons. Investigators have focused on one guard, identified as “turret gunner No. 3,” who fired a large number of rounds and was responsible for several fatalities.
Investigators found no evidence to support assertions by Blackwater employees that they were fired upon by Iraqi civilians. That finding sharply contradicts initial assertions by Blackwater officials, who said that company employees fired in self-defense and that three company vehicles were damaged by gunfire.
About the only bright spot for Blackwater: bureau officials appear inclined to give the guards the benefit of the doubt about the first round of shootings, in which Blackwater guards fired upon a white Kia sedan that didn't heed a traffic officer's order to stop at the square.
But so far, the FBI's account of the shooting is mostly in line with that of the Iraqi government and the U.S. military. In front of Congress and in a recent PR blitz, Blackwater owner and CEO Erik Prince has insisted that Blackwater guards were under attack. "There was definitely incoming small arms fire from insurgents," Prince told Wolf Blitzer last month. Blackwater has also consistently urged Congress, the press and the public to await the outcome of the FBI's investigation before passing judgment on the company.
Get beyond the surge. Go further than the talk about population protection being the new basis for U.S. efforts in Iraq. The Joint Campaign Plan is the comprehensive strategy for Iraq employed by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. It's a fairly important document. And Congress can't see it, reports Rachel Van Dongen for Roll Call. (sub. req.)
In television interviews and press conferences, Gen. David Petraeus has described the Joint Campaign Plan as the key military and diplomatic strategy to stabilize Iraq.
Developed by the “big brains” on the ground, Petraeus points to a “unified” effort with U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker to achieve political and military security in Iraq by 2009.
Yet despite repeat efforts at the highest levels and Pentagon promises, Congress has been unable to get a current copy of the plan.
After persistent requests from House Armed Services Chairman Ike Skelton (D-Mo.), the issue has moved up the Congressional chain of command to Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.). According to an aide, Pelosi asked President Bush for the document several months ago in a White House meeting. Since then, Pelosi’s staff has “repeatedly” requested a copy, her aide said, but has not yet received one.
A spokeswoman for the House Armed Services Committee generously declined to attribute the stonewalling to partisan politics. Yet the committee's request for the plan has been outstanding since the Pentagon missed a March 30 deadline for it. What's more, even though Congress hasn't seen the document, the head of a Government Accountability Office unit mentioned in October 30 testimony that his team saw the plan on a recent trip to Iraq.
Nor is Congress the only one left in the dark about why it can't see the plan. Van Dongen called the White House for an explanation, and it sent her to the Iraq command, known as Multinational Force-Iraq. An MNFI spokesperson told her, "I do not know why the White House would refer you to us regarding these questions." The Pentagon didn't reply, either. Three cheers for openness in government!
Via Joseph Neff, the Raleigh News & Observer's Blackwater blogger, CBS reported on Friday that the Iraqi government has drafted a piece of legislation removing legal immunity for U.S. security contractors. (One of the final decrees of U.S. proconsul Jerry Bremer in 2004 was to exempt contractors from prosecution in Iraqi courts, something with which the Iraqis have to date complied.)
You can read the draft here. (pdf) It's short, and the operative language is simple: "All immunities granted to [security contractors] in accordance with any valid legislation shall be canceled."
The significance, if passed? CBS:
That law still must be ratified by the Iraqi parliament, and if and when it is, private security firms would almost certainly pull out of Iraq.
“There’s no question it’s a disaster if this got passed,” said Carter Andress, one of an estimated 8,500 private security contractors guarding diplomats, convoys and reconstruction sites for the U.S. He is not willing to let his employees be subject to arrest by an Iraqi police force he believes is riddled with corruption and infiltrated by enemy fighters.
“How do we determine in that situation whether or not it's legitimate use of the rule of law or whether or not this is someone trying to kidnap one of us and take advantage of the situation,” he said.
Much remains unclear about Bernard Kerik's three-and-a-half months in Iraq running the Interior Ministry. But he was crystal clear about sending one message to his subordinates: he was the "eyes and ears of the Oval Office on the ground," recalls one of them.
Samuel Juett was one of 13 members of the Department of Justice's "first team" in Iraq following the 2003 invasion. Juett, speaking from his Eau Claire, Wisconsin home, counts himself as an admirer of Kerik's -- "Oh, man, lay off my buddy Bernie," he said, laughing -- because Kerik was someone with little patience for bureaucracy or politics. As soon as Kerik arrived in Baghdad on May 18, 2003, he let it be known just from where his power derived.
"There could only be so many big dogs in the pen," Juett recalls. Kerik would drop hints of his proximity to the White House. "That was intimated in conversations with us," Juett says. For example, Kerik would tell his staff, "You know, when the President's office calls you on the phone at home at night, and tells you to get on the plane..." Or: "Two days ago, I was standing in the Oval Office, talking to the President. This is what he wants, and this is what we're gonna make happen." Juett doesn't know if that was true -- "but it was what he said."
"It's really surprising that Blackwater is still out there killing people."
That's a quote from the director of Iraq's state-run television network, looking back in anger to an February shooting that prefigured the Nisour Square incident in September. In February, Blackwater guards on the roof of the Justice Ministry building in Baghdad's Salihiya neighborhood shot and killed three security guards at the nearby Iraqiya TV compound. There was no recompense to the victims' families. A cursory State Department investigation cleared Blackwater in full. And an Iraqi judge, citing CPA Order 17 --which gave U.S. contractors immunity from Iraqi prosecution -- rejected a court petition filed by the network.
The details remain subject to debate. Blackwater claims it was under attack, and the State Department backs up the company. Iraqis at the TV station and the Interior Ministry say the Blackwater guards opened fire without provocation. The story was first reported by Leila Fadel of McClatchy in September, and today Steve Fainaru of The Washington Post has an in-depth look at the incident.
We reported recently that the Center for Constitutional Rights is representing the families of the Iraqi victims of Blackwater's Nisour Square shootings in a lawsuit filed in U.S. court. That's one of only two lawsuits -- both filed by CCR, incidentally -- brought against U.S. contractors for potential crimes committed in Iraq. The other, brought against Titan Corporation and CACI in 2004 for their roles in prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, has been held up for years over legal questions over whether the victims have the right to sue. CACI provided an interrogator to the facility at Abu Ghraib, Steven Stefanowicz -- who "clearly knew that his instructions equated to physical abuse," according to the Taguba report -- while Titan provided two translators, John Israel and Adel Nakhla.
Well, today, the dam broke. The CACI suit will advance. The judge dismissed the suit against Titan, however, "because the translators performed their duties under the direct command and under the exclusive operational control of military personnel."
Despite the surge, sectarian and other violence has forced over two million Iraqis to flee their homes for safer harbors inside Iraq, the Iraqi Red Crescent reports:
The number of Iraqis fleeing their homes has more than quadrupled since the U.S. troop buildup began in February, leaving 2.3 million Iraqis displaced and further dividing the country along sectarian lines, according to a new report from the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.
The figures, which measured the number of internally displaced people at the end of September, present a grim accounting of the humanitarian crisis unfolding as Shiite militias and Sunni insurgent groups drive civilians, usually from the opposite sect, out of their homes, neighborhoods and cities.
More than 83 percent of those displaced were women and children, and most children were younger than 12, the report found. Most lived in Baghdad. Many lack adequate health services, cannot transfer their children to new schools and cannot find jobs.
The Red Crescent explains how it's trying to help the displaced persons here.
The U.S. military official in charge of supporting reconciliation efforts in Iraq says that unless the Shiite-led Iraqi government takes concrete steps to embrace the Sunnis, the new, mostly-Sunni ex-insurgent militias supported by the U.S. could return to insurgency.
Shiite officials are like an "enormous lion very, very afraid of a tiny mouse," Army Colonel Martin Stanton told a blogger conference call this afternoon. That mouse, however, isn't so tiny: over the past several months, hundreds if not thousands of irregular groups of (mostly) Sunni militiamen -- called "Concerned Local Citizens" by the U.S. military -- have been formed with U.S. support. Stanton, like other military officials, estimated their number at 67,000 men under arms, with 39,000 of them operating under "security contracts" with U.S. and allied forces. Ever since the U.S. began cooperating with Sunni tribal figures who agreed to turn against al-Qaeda, the Shiites have feared that U.S.-supported Sunni gunmen represent a threat to their political dominance.
Stanton believes Shiite reluctance to bring the so-called Concerned Local Citizens into the formal security forces and to hold provincial elections -- expected to benefit the Sunnis, who boycotted the last round of provincial voting in 2005 -- might guarantee precisely the result that the Shiites fear. "How long before all of these people trying to reconcile get discouraged at the continuous rebuff and come up with their own Plan B?" he asked. Plan B, Stanton assessed, might be either formal secession or to "pick up insurgency again." When I asked what the timetable might be for the Sunni Concerned Local Citizens to go to Plan B, he replied, "God, man, if I knew that, I'd be so much happier with my job than I am right now."
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Today's Must Read
In Iraq, Kerik Boasted of Being White House 'Eyes and Ears'
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