Relatively few Americans had heard of Allen Stanford until the last week or so. But it turns out that, over the last decade, the Texas billionaire had attracted the scrutiny of a range of government authorities, and been the subject of several civil suits -- so much so that it's hard to believe it took until last week for him to be formally charged.
Let's recap what we know about the various inquiries, investigations, and lawsuits focused on Stanford's sprawling financial empire over the last decade:
Circa 1998
- Stanford writes in a letter to the US ambassador to Antigua that he has been investigated by numerous agencies over the years, and none had found evidence of wrongdoing.
1999
- After Stanford finds that a former Mexican drug lord had used his bank to hide or launder money, he voluntarily makes out a cashier's check worth $3.1 million, and gives it to the Drug Enforcement Agency.
- The Treasury Department places Antigua -- where Stanford's business is based, and with whose government he is cozy -- on its money-laundering watch list.
Circa 1999
- Texas securities regulators find evidence of potential money laundering involving Stanford. They refer it to the FBI and the SEC, because it involves offshore banks. Texas securities commissioner Denise Voigt Crawford later tells the state legislative committee: "Why it took 10 years for the feds to move on it, I cannot answer." She added: "We worked with the FBI and the SEC and basically gave them the case. We told them what we'd seen and they were going to run with it."
2005
- A lawsuit filed in Florida accuses Stanford of aiding a Ponzi scheme.
2006
- The SEC's Fort Worth office opens an investigation into Stanford's business, but is asked by another agency to "stand down," and complies. (Rep. Dennis Kucinich, who chairs the House Domestic Policy subcommittee, asked late last week that the agency turn over documents related to that sequence of events.)
2006
- A second Florida lawsuit, this one filed by a former employee, accused Stanford of being involved in a Ponzi scheme.
2007
- Two former employees sue Stanford, alleging fraud.
- The SEC finds, during a routine exam, that Stanford's Houston-based broker-dealer operation is violating net capital requirements. The firm pays a $20,000 fine.
- Stanford Financial pays a $10,000 fine to FINRA in response to allegations that it gave out "misleading, unfair and unbalanced information" about its certificates of deposit.
2008
- Stanford Financial pays a $30,000 fine to FINRA in response to allegations that it didn't adequately disclose in its research reports its method for valuing certain securities, among other information.
- FBI opens an investigation into whether Stanford laundered drug money for Mexico's violent Gulf Cartel. Mexican authorities detained one of Stanford's private planes after officials found checks inside believed to be connected to the cartel. (The DEA also at some point probed Stanford for laundering drug money.)
- That inquiry into Stanford by the SEC's Fort Worth office is reopened, in the wake of widespread criticism of the agency for failing to catch Bernard Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme, and for de-emphasizing enforcement in recent years.
2009
- SEC files charges against Stanford, alleging "massive ongoing fraud."
As we reported last week, there's strong reason to believe that the SEC should have pushed harder on Stanford sooner. The long history of inquiries that failed to uncover Stanford's alleged $8 billion fraud only strengthens that notion.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (4) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (12)Did the SEC fall down on the job by not paying closer attention to Allen Stanford, the billionaire Texas banker accused of orchestrating an $8 billion fraud? One former long-time enforcement director for the agency thinks it may well have.
Robert Fusfeld, who spent 31 years as an SEC enforcement lawyer, and for 15 managed the trial unit in the commission's Denver office before retiring in 2006, told TPMmuckraker that there was plenty of reason for the SEC to aggressively scrutinize Stanford's operation.
"A registered broker dealer and registered investment adviser is selling offshore Caribbean CDs in mammoth volumes, and nobody's looking at the bonafides of the bank," he said.
The New York Times reported today that the Stanford Group paid several fines over the last few years after regulators found that it did not have enough capital to meet the requirements of being a broker-dealer and used misleading sales literature. "There were numerous very significant red flags that included a history of violations," said Fusfeld.
The case, he said, contained the "same kind of red flags as Madoff" -- like consistently high returns -- but with the added red flag of the Antiguan CDs. "It's not Germany, France, or England," he continued, noting the history of "flagrant offshore CD frauds" over the last 10-15 years.
Because Stanford was a registered broker dealer and investment adviser, the SEC had full access to its operation, Fusfeld added. "They can walk right in."
The SEC was publicly flogged earlier this month for its failure to catch Bernard Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme. Since then, its appears to have been making a special effort to show it's capable of acting aggressively -- a concern which may have affected the timing of the Stanford complaint filed Tuesday.
It would certainly be ironic if, in this case too, it was found to have fallen down on the job.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (12) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (6)Here at TPMmuckraker, the more we think about the Allen Stanford saga, the more it seems like a kind of harmonic convergence of recent high-profile muck.
The emerging story's range of ties -- some incidental, some more substantive -- to some other high-profile scandals of the past few years, from Bermard Madoff to Jack Abramoff to Rod Blagojevich -- is pretty striking.
First, Madoff.
It's not just that questions about the pace of the SEC's Stanford investigation -- including whether the agency's decision to bring charges yesterday was prompted in part by recent news reports -- have to be considered in light of the SEC's well-documented missteps on the Madoff case.
It's also that, according to the SEC complaint, Stanford's investors were exposed to losses via Madoff -- but falsely assured them they weren't.
From the complaint:
In a December 2008 Monthly Report, the bank told investors that their money was safe because SID "had no direct or indirect exposure to any of [Bernard] Madoffs investments."But, contrary to this statement, at least $400,000 in Tier 2 was invested in Meridian, a New York-based hedge fund that used Tremont Partners as its asset manager. Tremont invested approximately 6-8% of the SIB assets they indirectly managed with Madoffs investment firm.
Pendergest, Davis and Stanford knew about this exposure to loss relating to the Meridian investment. On December 15, 2008, an Analyst informed Pendergast, Davis and Stanford in a weekly report that his "rough estimate is a loss of $400k ... based on the indirect exposure" to Madoff'.
As for Abramoff, we reported yesterday that a bevvy lawmakers with ties to the crooked lobbyist or a history of other ethical problems - including then-GOP members of Congress Bob Ney, Katherine Harris, Tom Feeney, and John Sweeney, as well as current Rep. Charlie Rangel -- went on a 2005 junket to Antigua that was funded by an organization with close links to Stanford.
Indeed, until yesterday, that organization, the Inter-American Economic Council, had photographs from the trip -- showing Harris, Feeney, and pals hobnobbing in splendor with Antiguan dignitaries -- posted on its website. It's since removed them, but not before we saved them. You can see the slideshow here.
And there's also another congressional angle which, though not on a par with the Abramoff sleaze, nonetheless appears to reflect the cynical money-for-access culture that has characterized Washington politics in recent years:
In 2002, as we reported yesterday, after lobbying from Stanford's firm, the Democratic-controlled Senate killed a bill designed to bolster efforts to catch financial fraud. During that cycle, Stanford's company had given an eye-popping $800,000 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. And according to campaign finance records examined by TPMmuckraker, it had also given generously to key Democrats on the Senate Banking committee: $8000 to Chuck Schumer, $6000 to Chris Dodd, and $1000 to then-chair Paul Sarbanes.
So there's that.
What about Blago?
Well, it turns out that, according to lobby disclosure reports examined by TPMmuckraker, one of Stanford's paid lobbyists in 2002 -- the year that the firm was lobbying on the anti-financial-fraud bill -- was John Wyma. One form lists Wyma and his team's work as "Helping them address legislature (sic) which involves financial services companies."
In case you'd forgotten, Wyma used to be one of Blagojevich's closest aides, before cooperating with Pat Fitzgerald's investigation by secretly recording conversations with the then governor.
The two were apparently think as thieves at one time. The Chicago Tribune reported at the time of Blago's arrest:
The governor routinely reported exchanging personal gifts and often appeared at Wyma-sponsored fundraisers where Wyma's clients hobnobbed with the governor before turning over checks for his campaign fund.
Now all we need is a link to the U.S. Attorney firings, and we'll be all set.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (8) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (4)Reuters reports:
Massachusetts' top securities regulator said on Wednesday that the wife of accused financial swindler Bernard Madoff took out roughly $15 million from an account managed by Cohmad Securities days before her husband was arrested and charged with securities fraud.
More as we get it...
Late Update: The Wall Street Journal has more. The information about Ruth Madoff comes from a complaint filed by the office of Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin, which is probing the role of Cohmad Securities, a company co-owned by Bernie Madoff.
The complaint says Ruth Madoff withdrew the money from Cohmad.
Reports the Journal:
The complaint seeks to revoke the registration of Cohmad, a New York-based firm that has an office in Boston. The complaint says Cohmad has refused to provide information regarding its activities in Massachusetts, its relationship with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities and "Cohmad's apparent role in the transfer of moneys from Madoff Investments to Cohmad personnel."PERMALINK | COMMENTS (10) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (11)
The changes at the SEC continuing apace.
Days after the agency was excoriated by whistleblower Harry Markopolos, and by lawmakers, for failing to catch Bernie Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme, CNBC reports that enforcement director Linda Thomsen -- whose department came in for perhaps the most criticism over Madoff, will likely announce her departure today.
And several outlets have reported, starting over the weekend, that Thomsen's replacement will be Robert Khuzami, a former federal prosecutor who's now Deutsche Bank's top lawyer.
During Thomsen's tenure, the SEC has, by many accounts, devoted fewer resources to enforcement, and made it more difficult for investigators to obtain subpoenas -- changes led in large part by former chair Chris Cox.
As for Khuzami, he's a Republican who spoke at the 2004 GOP Convention in support of the Patriot Act and President Bush's policies in the war on terror. But as a prosecutor, he successfully oversaw some high-profile cases. He was part of the team that got convictions of a blind Egyptian cleric and nine others for a failed plot to blow up New York City landmarks. And, crucially, he led the team that won a conviction on the largest previous known Ponzi scheme, in which Patrick Bennett bilked investors out of $700 million. In 1997, the Clinton Justice Department gave Khuzami its highest citation, the Attorney General's Award for Exceptional Service.
In addition, on Friday the new SEC chair, Mary Schapiro, named David Becker, a partner at Cleary Gottlieb, as the agency's top lawyer. Becker held the same position from 2000 to 2002.
So the names on the doors of senior officials are certainly changing. Whether that improves the agency's regulatory performance, of course, remains to be seen. But the old crew was hardly inspiring confidence.
The SEC is deep in the midst of beating itself up over its failure over many years to catch Bernard Madoff's alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme. Just yesterday, agency chair Mary Schapiro told Congress in a letter that "there needs to be a full accounting, both of Mr. Madoff's activities and why we did not detect the fraud, which we regret."
But is it in danger of making the same mistakes the second time around as the first?
The SEC's civil case against Madoff, hurriedly filed in December 2008 after Madoff allegedly confessed to his lawyer, is being conducted out of the agency's New York regional office, where Madoff's business was based. But it was the New York office that conducted the 2006 inquiry into Madoff that famously came up dry. That inquiry, which found only a few technical violations and recommended that Madoff register as an investment adviser, is now itself one focus of the investigation by the SEC's inspector general into how the agency failed to catch Madoff.
According to one former SEC enforcement veteran, in other cases where the agency opened a second investigation after a regional office was found to have slipped up the first time around, the second probe has sometimes been run out of the Washington headquarters, to ensure that it retains public confidence. That wasn't done here.
Asked about the matter by TPMmuckraker, an SEC spokesman declined to comment.
But there may be even less distance between the two Madoff investigations.
The current case is being led by Andrew Calamari, the Associate Regional Director for the New York office, who last month publicly called the Madoff case "a stunning fraud that appears to be of epic proportions." Calamari's name is listed prominently on the agency's civil complaint.
But Calamari appears tied to the ill-fated 2006 effort. Doria Bachenheimer, an Assistant Regional Director in the New York office "reviewed and approved" the decision to close that inquiry, according to a "Case Closing Recommendation" document obtained by the Wall Street Journal.
And an organizational chart produced by the agency in 2006, and obtained by TPMmuckraker, indicates that Calamari is Bachenheimer's supervisor. That reading of the chart was confirmed to TPMmucraker by the ex-SECer.
It's not clear that Calamari played any active role in the failed 2006 inquiry. But at the very least, the fact that he supervised the staffer who wrongly approved closing it -- and the fact that there's no evidence he raised red flags about her work -- might suggest he's not the ideal person to handle the followup, especially given the high public profile the case has taken on.
Calamari referred an inquiry from TPMmuckraker to the SEC's press office, which again declined to comment.
Remember that weird moment during yesterday's Madoff hearings, when the SEC's top lawyer, Andy Vollmer, declined to answer questions, and kinda sorta implied he was asserting executive privilege, before backing off that claim when pressed by lawmakers? The moment that provoked Rep. Gary Ackerman's blunt assessment: "We thought the enemy was Mr. Madoff. I think it's you"?
One staffer described the Vollmer moment to TPMmuckraker as a "bombshell" within the agency's headquarters.
And it looks like the SEC is a little embarrassed about it -- and about the general evasiveness of other agency brass in their testimony yesterday.
Check out this letter, which the SEC's new chair, Mary Schapiro, sent to the committee last night.
Schapiro tells lawmakers that the hearing "cannot have been satisfactory for you." She admits that there needs to be a full accounting of what went wrong, and offers to meet with the lawmakers, at their earliest convenience, to "determine a course forward that will meet all of our interests."
As for the Vollmer issue itself, an agency spokesman confirmed that he wasn't claiming the privilege, but couldn't offer any further explanation, saying he'd get back to us.
Another interesting moment from the House committee hearings on the Bernard Madoff case.
Lori Richards, the director of the agency's Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations, told the committee she recused herself from the Madoff probe because a former employee she supervised had married Madoff's niece, and Richards was at the wedding.
She was referring to Eric Swanson, an SEC lawyer who married Shana Madoff in 2006. Shana Madoff had worked for her uncle's firm as a compliance lawyer.
The admission that Richards -- the top SEC official overseeing examinations of brokers -- recused herself, points up the way in which Madoff's cozy ties to regulators helped his scheme go undetected.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (0) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (8)Harry Markopolos, the Bernard Madoff whistleblower, ended his testimony about an hour ago. But before he did, he fleshed out his thoughts about Madoff's ties to organized crime.
In a remarkable moment, Markopolos even addressed the mobsters directly, arguing -- in an apparent effort to convince them not to go after him -- that he was protecting them Madoff's scheme.
Here's the exchange with Rep. Gary Ackerman:
ACKERMAN: I'm talking about, when you talk about the Russian mob and organized crime, these are people who invested through European investors or European feeder funds?MARKOPOLOS: Correct. And I didn't fear of them, and I didn't think they were going to come after me, I want to make this perfectly clear to all those Russian mobsters and Latin American drug cartels out there...
ACKERMAN: You're talking directly to them.
MARKOPOLOS: I was acting on your behalf trying to stop him from zeroing out your accounts. I'm the good guy here. Just like to make that clear.
ACKERMAN: Uh, yeah I think we registered that.
Here's the video:
Throughout his testimony, Harry Markopolos seemed to be refining his effort to express, in one crisp sound byte, his low opinion of the SEC's investigative powers.
And right at the end, he seemed to hit on it. He told the committee (the exact wording may be a little off here, we're going from memory):
If you flew the entire SEC staff to Boston, and sat them in Fenway Park, they wouldn't be able to find first base.
Might be hard to top that.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (2) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (28)A stunning claim just made by whistleblower Harry Markpolos helps further explain how the SEC failed to catch Madoff.
Referring to Bloomberg computer terminals, Markopolos said that the agency "might have one per regional office."
Bloomberg's terminals sit on the desk of almost every trader on Wall Street, providing a steady stream of live market data. It would be extremely difficult to detect sophisticated financial fraud without this basic tool of modern trading.
We've contacted current and former SEC sources to ask whether Markopolos' claim is accurate, and we'll keep you posted.
Late Update:
Reader FH writes in to say that Bloomberg terminals aren't useful for detecting fraud:
I'm a quant at a hedge fund, and have a bloomberg terminal that I share with a colleague.You detect fraud by runnnig statistical tests on data, or I suppose by forensic accounting (which I don't know anything about). Not by watching live scrolling news feeds or flickering prices on a terminal.
I would say you should take as your model the 1994 paper by Bill Christie and Paul Schultz that detected implicit nasdaq market maker collusion as how enforcement research is going to be done.
In my view, it does not help his credibility if Markopolos is talking about the paucity of Bloomberg terminals at SEC offices.
Late Late Update:
Robert Fusfeld, who retired in 2006 as a senior enforcement lawyer in the SEC's Denver office, confirms to TPMmuckraker that when he left, that office had only one terminal.
For a while now, there have been suggestions that Bernard Madoff had ties to organized crime. And Harry Markopolos just told Congress that those alleged connections made him fear for his life as a whistleblower working to expose Madoff's scheme.
When a committee member referred to Markopolos' "paranoia" about his safety, he responded by referring to Madoff's "dirty money."
Here's the full quote:
I don't consider it paranoia. And the reason is, Mr. Madoff was running such a large scheme of unimaginable size and complexity, and he had a lot of dirty money. And let me describe dirty money to you. When you're that big and you're that secrective, you're going to attract a lot of organized crime money, and which we now know came from the Russian mob and the Latin American drug cartel, and when you are zeroing out mobsters, you have a lot to fear. And he could not afford to get caught, because once he was caught. And if he would've known my name and knew he had a team tracking him, I didn't think I was long for this world.
The open worship of whistleblower Harry Markopolos by members of the House committee, which had already emerged at times this morning, has reached its apotheosis.
Rep. Jackie Speier just told him:
I would like to say for the record that I see you as a modern-day Greek hero.
Harry Markopolos, the whistle-blower on the Berrnard Madoff case, just offered a remarkable cloak-and-dagger tidbit in his testimony before a House committee, demonstrating his commitment to bringing Madoff to justice.
He said he offered to go under cover, "as I was trained to in the army," -- and wearing a disguise -- in order to catch Madoff.
Here's the full quote:
In fact, I made an offer to the SEC in my October 2001 submission, if you look closely, you'll see, I offered to go undercover for the SEC, under their command and control, and have no one know where I was, except my wife, and have no contact with my family, during this time. And I would have assumed a disguise, as I was trained to in the army, and gone under cover and led that team to a successful result very quickly. I don't know what more I could do to put it on the line.
We don't either. Though the wife exception makes it seem like maybe he wasn't really committed enough.
Late Update:
And here's the video:
Harry Markopolos just warned that he's got another alleged fraudster in his sights.
"I plan to turn in a $1 billion mini-Madoff to the SEC's inspector general tomorrow," he said.
That may have put a scare into some on Wall Street.
Markopolos identifies another problem with the SEC:
"They were a captive regulator. Mr. Madoff was too big," he just told Congress. "They looked at Madoff and said: 'he's a big firm, we dont attack big firms.'"
Markopolos just put his finger on perhaps the key problem in the SEC's failure to catch Madoff:
"We need a highly trained finance team that is highly incentivized to look for frauds. Derivatives are too complicated otherwise," he said. "They had no idea how to do the math."
In other words, today's sophisticated Wall Street deals are simply too complex for the SEC's enforcement staff, as currently composed, to properly understand.
The only way to fix the problem, it appears, is to hire staff with more expertise.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (7) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (6)"I gift wrapped and delivered the largest Ponzi scheme in history to them and somehow they couldn't be bothered to conduct a thorough and proper investigation," he just told Congress, referring to the SEC's performance on the Madoff case.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (1) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (10)"They haven't earned their paycheck, and they need to be replaced."
The whistleblower on the Madoff case, Harry Markopolos, just gave his oral testimony, in which he ripped the SEC in unusually direct language. More to come.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (3) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (14)Harry Markopolos, the fraud investigator who blew the whistle as early as a decade ago on Bernard Madoff, if only the SEC had had ears to listen, slammed the agency in written testimony made public last night.
Markopolos, who will answer questions in person before a House committee this morning, decried the SEC's inadequate efforts to detect financial fraud in response to detailed written complaints he submitted on Madoff's operation.
"There was an abject failure by the regulatory agencies we entrust as our watchdog," he wrote. According to (sub req.) the Wall Street Journal, Markopolos added that the agency's enforcement staff "made little effort to understand the derivative instruments Mr. Madoff said he was using."
Markopolos continued:
[T]he SEC securities' lawyers if only through their ineptitude and financial illiteracy colluded to maintain large frauds such as the one to which Madoff later confessed.
He even confessed that he and his team had submitted some documents anonymously -- because they feared for their safety in going after Madoff, given their target's powerful status on Wall Street.
Last month, we documented the SEC's shift away from enforcement here at TPMmuckraker.
We'll bring you more form Markopolos' live testimony after it starts this morning.
PERMALINK | COMMENTS (2) | RECOMMEND RECOMMEND (4)
