Ben Bernanke

Congress To Bernanke: Hand Over Docs On BofA-Merrill Deal

Zachary Roth | June 9, 2009, 6:16PM

Congress has subpoenaed the Federal Reserve, to force it to hand over documents about its role in Bank of America's takeover of Merrill Lynch during the financial crisis last fall, reports Reuters.

Staffers for the House Oversight committee, chaired by Rep. Ed Towns of New York, had been allowed to view the documents at the Fed. But Towns has now concluded that the committee needs to have the documents in its possession. The Fed has said it will comply with the subpoena.

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AIG

Is Probe Of AIG Bailout, Payments To Counter-Parties, In The Offing?

Zachary Roth | March 25, 2009, 2:48PM

Is the momentum building for an investigation into the real beneficiaries of AIG's latest bailout?

Earlier this month, the Treasury Department announced it was rescuing the fallen insurance giant yet again, bringing the total amount of taxpayer assistance given to the firm since last September to $170 billion. It soon became clear that much of that money -- over $49 billion, to be exact -- was going right through AIG to the counter-parties on its credit default swaps, both American banks like Goldman Sachs, and foreign ones like DeutscheBank.

Defenders of the move have argued that not giving the counter-parties this indirect bailout would have risked a wider financial collapse.

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AIG

Wall Street To Washington: "I Want My Campaign Contributions Back"

Moe Tkacik | March 25, 2009, 1:33PM

Yes, that was an actual sentence spoken -- or more specifically "groused" -- by an anonymous Wall Street executive concerned for his "personal safety," though not enough to be dissuaded from attending or talking to a reporter at yesterday's Wall Street Journal 'Future Of Finance' Conference, where the future sounded like it had gone back in time and purchased a hundred billion dollars worth of extra credit protection, which is to say suspiciously like Finance Past.

It looks like Wall Street, no doubt emboldened by the recent 20% runup in the S&P 500, the fourteen bucks in matching leverage the government is offering them for every dollar they invest in toxic/"legacy" assets and the prospect of better-than-awful numbers at Citigroup and Credit Suisse, got its hubris back along with its proverbial groove. In the six months since it nearly triggered global financial Armageddon, the investment banking community has seemed, if not quite chastened, at least somewhat subdued amidst the nation's ever-heightening awareness that their industry engineered the ever-intensifying economic morass. But not anymore!

This morning the New York Times ran as an op-ed the resignation letter of one Jake DeSantis, a securities trader and executive vice president at AIG's infamous financial products division and recipient of one of those million dollar bonuses ($742,006.40 after taxes.) That's right: he's keeping it. And don't ask him if he feels guilty about it because he will tell you: NO.

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Goldman Sachs

Government Sachs: TARP Funds Just The Tip Of The Iceberg For Goldman

Zachary Roth | March 24, 2009, 12:39PM

Goldman Sachs is planning to give back the TARP money it got last fall, "ideally in the next month," reports the New York Times.

The firm is saying it just can't handle the level of government oversight that comes along with the funds, especially amid the outrage over AIG bonuses. "It's just impossible to run our business in this environment," one exec told the Times' Andrew Ross Sorkin.

Sounds great.

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AIG

The Rise And Fall Of AIG's Financial Products Unit

Zachary Roth and Ben Buchwalter | March 20, 2009, 9:36AM

As we delve into the back-story behind the collapse of AIG, we thought it might be useful to lay out some key factual information about the firm's Financial Products unit, known as AIGFP, whose disastrous credit default swaps brought the company to its knees. How and when did AIG Financial Products get started? Who ran it, and from where? How did it get into credit default swaps, and what exactly are they, anyway? And how did this group of derivatives traders eventually wind up bringing down one of the most admired financial firms in the world?

So here's a rundown of some of the key developments in AIGFP's tumultuous history -- many gleaned from a superb three-part December 2008 Washington Post series on the unit (parts 1, 2, and 3):

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AIG

Warren: Is AIG Bailout Money Going To Pay Off "Speculators"?

Zachary Roth | March 11, 2009, 12:31PM

Looks like you can add Elizabeth Warren to the growing list of people who want the federal government to tell us more about that latest AIG bailout.

Warren, who chairs the panel that's monitoring bailout spending on behalf of Congress, went on MSNBC's Rachel Maddow Show last night, and all but demanded more disclosure from Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner.

Maddow raised the fact that AIG has reportedly passed bailout money onto its counterparties on those credit default swaps, and that it currently has four PR firms on its payroll. In response, Warren, appearing perhaps more frustrated than in any of her other numerous media appearances over the last few most, responded:

It doesn't seem strange to me, and the fact that it doesn't seem strange to me tells you something really awful about what it's been like to be in Washington for the last few months.

These financial institutions have figured out that they're bleeding red ink, and their best solution is to persuade the Treasury Department to give them lots of money. And when the Treasury Department starts to say, there may be some problems here, the American people don't want to go along with this, then lets see if we can spin the American people on it.

The Treasury Department has not asked for the critical information about where this money has gone, from AIG. We've poured the money into AIG, and it has somehow poured it out the other end. The Treasury Department has not asked, and has not revealed, what it is that's happening with that money.

And so as long as that's the case, maybe some of the money is going to other financial institutions. Maybe some of the money is going to pay off these credit default swaps that are essential for saving other institutions that have counted on it for credit and insurance. And maybe some of where this money is going is just off to speculators, who just played the game of speculation, and would now like to collect a hundred cents on the dollar form their speculations, and collect it indirectly from the American taxpayer.

You can see the video here. (The excerpt quoted above begins around the 9:00 mark.)

The Federal Reserve, which has been at the center of the latest AIG bailout, has declined to reveal much information about the maneuver, including the identity of AIG's counterparties, saying that doing so could affect confidence in the institutions at issue.

Reports by Warren's panel have grown increasingly critical of Treasury's level of transparency and accountability in regard to the bailout.

AIG

AIG Counter-Party List Is Heavy On Foreign Banks

Zachary Roth | March 9, 2009, 11:11AM

Last week, we rounded up some reports from last fall that named some of the banks that AIG did business with on those credit-default swaps -- and therefore offered a first pass at where the fallen insurance behemoth's latest round of bailout money might ultimately be going.

But over the weekend, the Wall Street Journal offered some updated reporting (sub. req.) on that score. It obtained a confidential document listing banks that have been paid a total of roughly $50 billion by AIG, since it was first bailed out last fall.

Here's the Journal's list:

* Goldman Sachs
* Deutsche Bank
* Merrill Lynch
* Société Générale
* Calyon
* Barclays
* Rabobank
* Danske
* HSBC
* Royal Bank of Scotland
* Banco Santander
* Morgan Stanley
* Wachovia
* Bank of America
* Lloyds Banking Group

That includes $6 billion each for Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank.

As you can see, there's some overlap there with what we told you the Journal and the New York Times had previously reported.

But the new list shows how many of AIG's counter-parties were European -- a fact that's likely to add to frustration, among members of Congress and the public, that US taxpayer dollars are ultimately being used to save foreign banks from the consequences of their disastrous decisions to do credit default swaps with AIG. It's also likely to further fuel congressional demands that the federal government identify all of AIG's trading partners.

AIG

Who Are The AIG Counterparties? Here Are Some...

Zachary Roth | March 5, 2009, 4:58PM

Over at TPM, Josh has been doggedly highlighting the refusal of both AIG and the federal government to reveal the identity of AIG's counter-parties in its disastrous credit default swaps. And several lawmakers have in recent days pressed Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke on the issue.

The question matters, of course, because AIG needed to make its most recent multi-billion dollar trip back to the public trough (that's over $160 billion in all for AIG, if you're counting) in order to pay back its creditors on those disastrous swaps -- and thereby, we're told, prevent a wider financial collapse. So identifying who those swaps were made with will tell us, in effect, who this latest portion of our money is ultimately going to.

It's worth noting, then, that, thanks to some great reporting from the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, we do in fact have some preliminary information about who AIG's partners were on the swaps.

This Journal story from October 2008 names the following nine American and foreign banks as having bought swaps from AIG: Goldman Sachs; Merrill Lynch; UBS of Switzerland; Credit Agricole SA of France; Deutsche Bank of Germany; Barclays, and Royal Bank of Scotland Group, of Britain; and CIBC, and Bank of Montreal, of Canada.

Merrill is described by the Journal as a "big client" of the AIG unit that did the swaps.

By the end of 2007, with the value of the underlying assets plummeting, many of these banks had asked for collateral on the swaps, according to the Journal.

For instance, the paper reports that Goldman held swaps that insured about $20 billion of securities. In August 2007, Goldman demanded $1.5 billion in collateral from AIG. It ultimately got $450 million, then another $1.5 billion last October. At that point, says the Journal:

Goldman hedged its exposure by making a bearish bet on AIG, buying credit-default swaps on AIG's own debt.

That picture of Goldman's exposure jibes with a New York Times story from September 2008 about the credit default swaps, which reported that Goldman was AIG's "largest trading partner," and likewise gave a figure of $20 billion for Goldman's exposure to AIG.

The Times also implicates another domestic firm: JP Morgan (now JP Morgan Chase). In fact, it recounts that it was derivatives traders from that company that a decade ago, first brought to AIG's London-based financial products unit, run by Joseph Cassano, the ill-fated idea of doing credit default swaps.

It reports:

Ten years ago, a "watershed" moment changed the profile of the derivatives that Mr. Cassano traded, according to a transcript of comments he made at an industry event last year. Derivatives specialists from J. P. Morgan, a leading bank that had many dealings with Mr. Cassano's unit, came calling with a novel idea.

Morgan proposed the following: A.I.G. should try writing insurance on packages of debt known as "collateralized debt obligations." C.D.O.'s. were pools of loans sliced into tranches and sold to investors based on the credit quality of the underlying securities.

It's not 100 percent clear, then, that JP Morgan Chase is a current counter-party of AIG on the swaps -- but it certainly wouldn't be surprising.

That same Times story offers another hint, albeit a vague one, about the identity of the counter-parties.

While clients and counterparties remain closely guarded secrets in the derivatives trade, Mr. Cassano talked publicly about how proud he was of his customer list.

At the 2007 conference he noted that his company worked with a "global swath" of top-notch entities that included "banks and investment banks, pension funds, endowments, foundations, insurance companies, hedge funds, money managers, high-net-worth individuals, municipalities and sovereigns and supranationals."

What to make of all this? Well, here's one thing. As Josh has noted, the usual argument given against disclosing the identities of the counter-parties is that it would reduce public confidence in the banks that were named, with potentially disastrous consequences for their positions. But there's little evidence we're aware of that any of the banks named above suffered such an effect when, for instance, the Journal and the Times published their stories -- whose accuracy have not been questioned.

In fact, Geithner and Bernanke haven't deigned to explain their position in even this much detail -- so it's difficult to know whether there are factors we're not considering. But in the absence of a fuller explanation, we'll keep pressing...

Ben Bernanke

Report: Bernanke Threatened B Of A Over Merrill Deal

Zachary Roth | February 5, 2009, 11:45AM

We already knew, that, after it got wind of Merrill Lynch's massive fourth-quarter losses back in December, Bank of America had thought about pulling out of its deal to buy the troubled investment bank -- before being talked into it by the federal government.

But today, the Wall Street Journal adds some fascinating detail (sub. req.) about the level of hardball that the government played in making sure the deal went through.

Bush Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed chief Ben Bernanke reportedly warned B of A CEO Ken Lewis that if his firm pulled out, Merrill would collapse. They added that such a move, in the Journal's words "could undercut confidence in Bank of America, both in the markets and among government officials."

But that was just the start. Two days later, on a conference call, Bernanke told B of A that if it abandoned the Merrill deal, and came back to the Feds in the future seeking more bailout money, the government would consider removing the firm's executives and directors.

The threats, of course, seem to have worked, since Bank of America went ahead with the deal -- getting an additional $20 billion in bailout money to help digest Merrill.

Bernanke and Paulson may have been right to take such a hard line. But the episode suggests the level of control of day-to-day control that the government has had over the financial sector, since stepping in to rescue it last fall. Nationalizing the banks is still seen, in the mainstream debate as an extreme solution. But if the Feds are essentially making major operational decisions for the big banks, some would say they've been nationalized already -- it's just that no one wants to it.

Bailout

Fed Mum On Efforts To Prevent Conflicts Of Interest For Investment Firms

Zachary Roth | January 8, 2009, 4:21PM

As regular Muck readers know, we've been tracking the transparency -- or lack thereof -- of the Federal Reserve's program to buy up $500 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities in an effort to boost the housing market.

And today it's worth focusing on the issue of conflicts of interest.

The four outside investment firms hired by the Fed to manage the program -- Blackrock Inc., Goldman Sachs, Wellington Management, and PIMCO -- began buying up assets this week. So one assumes that the conflict of interest provisions that the Fed has said it has in its contracts with the four companies must be firmly in place by now.

But the Fed still is telling us almost nothing about what those crucial provisions entail. A department spokesman did not respond to a call from TPMmuckraker requesting information on what the Fed is doing to guard against conflicts of interest among the investment firms managing our money.

So far, all we know on the subject is what the Fed told us in a fact sheet posted last month on its website:

What measures will the Federal Reserve take to ensure that an investment manager implementing the MBS program will not have an unfair advantage relative to other market participants due to the information it receives about the MBS program?

Each investment manager will be required to implement ethical walls that appropriately segregate the investment management team that implements the Federal Reserve's agency MBS program from other advisory and proprietary trading activities of the firm. The New York Fed will monitor each investment manager's compliance with this requirement.

What sort of "ethical walls"? How will they work? How will the Fed monitor each investment manager's compliance? (After all, the Treasury doesn't appear to be taking its duty to monitor similar conflicts with TARP money all that seriously).

We're still in the dark.

It bears repeating: this isn't an abstract issue. The potential for these firms to improperly use, in their other investment work, the information they've been granted access to is enormous. Relatedly, the Fed's broader stonewalling on the structure of the contracts (or anything to do with the contracts whatsoever!) means we have no guarantee that the firms are being incentivized to get taxpayers the best possible deal.

Ben Bernanke

In Reversal, Fed Now Won't Release Key Doc On Asset-Buying Program

Zachary Roth | January 7, 2009, 11:08AM

Last week, we looked at the process by which the New York Federal Reserve selected four investment firms to manage its program to purchase $500 billion of mortgage-backed securities, in order to bolster the housing market.

Or at least, we tried to.

A fact sheet on the website of the New York Fed, announcing the details of the program stated that "a competitive request for proposal (RFP) process was employed" to select the four firms -- Blackrock Inc., Goldman Sachs, Wellington Management, and PIMCO. A Fed spokesman declined last week to give TPMmuckraker any information about the value of the contracts or the nature of the firms' successful bids. But he did tell us that he expected to be able to provide us with a copy of the RFP, after it had been inspected by Fed lawyers.

But now things seem to have changed. The spokesman hasn't responded to our followup calls, placed this week, about the RFP. In other words, not only will the Fed not tell us how much its paying the firms to manage our money, it won't even release the document it used to solicit bids for the contract.

As for the firms themselves, they've been just as tight-lipped. As we noted at the time, the first three referred us to the Fed, and PIMCO didn't return our calls at all.

To be clear, there's no evidence that these firms were improperly selected -- though the fact that PIMCO's founder was, as we've reported, loudly calling back in September for the government to launch just such an MBS purchase program does create some interesting optics, at the least.

But don't taxpayers have a right to know some basic details about the process by which these private investment firms -- at least one already the recipient of massive government largesse -- were hired to manage our money? We think so...

Bailout

Firms Hired By Fed To Manage Our Assets Won't Say How Much They're Being Paid

Zachary Roth | January 2, 2009, 2:09PM

So, how much are the four firms hired to manage the Fed's mortgage-backed securities purchase program getting paid for their work, and how did they get the contracts in the first place?

They're not saying.

We called Blackrock Inc., Goldman Sachs, Wellington Management, and PIMCO to ask them about their recently announced contracts to manage a total of $500 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities, on behalf of the Federal Reserve. Spokespeople for the first three firms told us they were referring all questions to the Fed. Representatives for PIMCO -- whose founder said in September that his firm would manage a very similar Treasury program for free, out of patriotic duty -- have not responded to two messages.

A spokesman for the New York Fed told TPMmuckraker he'd get back to us with more information.

"The selection of these managers seems incredibly opaque," Jeffrey Gundlach, the chief investment officer for the invesment firm TCW, and an expert in mortgage-backed securities, told TPMmuckraker.

Indeed, the Fed has so far provided little detailed information on the process by which these firms were selected. In a fact sheet posted on their website, the Fed wrote:

Because of the size and complexity of the agency MBS program, a competitive request for proposal (RFP) process was employed to select four investment managers and a custodian ... The selection criteria were based on the institution's operational capacity, size, overall experience in the MBS market and a competitive fee structure.

We'll keep you posted on what we learn from the Fed...

Federal Reerve

Gross Profits: PIMCO Hired To Manage Bailout That Benefited It

Zachary Roth | December 31, 2008, 3:09PM

Over at TPM, we noted earlier today the news that the Federal Reserve has hired four investment firms -- BlackRock, Goldman Sachs, PIMCO and Wellington Management Company -- to manage its mortgage-backed securities purchase program, in which it will buy up $500 billion worth of mortgage bonds, in an effort to boost the housing market.

It'd be nice to know more about why all of these companies were selected, and how much they're being paid -- and we've put those questions to the Fed. But for a number of reasons, one of the four firms, bond giant PIMCO, stands out as a particularly interesting choice.

As of June 30th, 61 percent of PIMCO's holdings -- $500 billion -- were in the very mortgage backed securities that it's now being hired by the Fed to buy back on behalf of US taxpayers, according to a September Bloomberg report that cited data on PIMCO's own website.

That could explain why, as financial blogger Rolfe Winkler pointed out earlier today, PIMCO chief Bill Gross was sounding the alarm in early September about the disastrous fate that would befall the US economy unless the government started buying up troubled mortgage assets.

In a September 4 post on PIMCO's website, Gross warned:

If we are to prevent a continuing asset and debt liquidation of near historic proportions, we will require policies that open up the balance sheet of the U.S. Treasury.

Within days, the Treasury had done what Gross was asking. In other words, as Peter Cohan, a professor of management at Babson College, put it at the time in a post on Bloggingstocks.com:

Bill Gross, who manages $830 billion, has convinced the U.S. Treasury to use your taxpayer dollars to bail him out of his bad investments.

And Gross seems to have had his eye on the endgame for a while here too. Later that month, he argued in a Washington Post oped that a broader bailout -- what became the TARP -- was also desperately needed, and he seemed to suggest that his own PIMCO would be a perfect candidate to manage the funds.

He wrote (via nexis):

Calls for appropriate oversight of this auction process are more than justified. There are disinterested firms, some not even based on Wall Street, with the expertise to evaluate these complicated pools of mortgages and other assets to assure taxpayers that their money is being wisely invested. (itals ours)

PIMCO, or the Pacific Investment Management Company, is based in Newport Beach, California.

In an interview shortly afterwards with CNBC's Erin Burnett, Gross presented his willingness to take on that job as a patriotic stand, pledging that PIMCO would work for no fee, "if everybody else worked on the same basis." (It's around the 4:25 mark).

And now the Fed has given him what's essentially the same job.

Will Gross stand by his pledge to work for free? We've called PIMCO to ask, and will keep you posted on what we found out. But given how Gross has made out so far, we're not holding our breath.