Yesterday, CREW and VoteVets.org released an email from a FOIA request that showed an employee in the Veterans Administration "suggesting" that staff ought to "refrain from giving a diagnosis of [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] straight out" to "compensation seeking veterans" and that VA staff members "really don't . . . have time to do the extensive testing that should be done to determine PTSD."

The Washington Post identified the official in a story this morning as Norma Perez, a psychologist who helps lead the PTSD program at the Department of Veterans Affairs' Olin E. Teague Veterans' Center in Temple, Texas. The VA responded that it was simple Perez's bad idea:

Veterans Affairs Secretary James B. Peake said in a statement that Perez's e-mail was "inappropriate" and does not reflect VA policy. It has been "repudiated at the highest level of our health care organization," he said.

"VA's leadership will strongly remind all medical staff that trust, accuracy and transparency is paramount to maintaining our relationships with our veteran patients," Peake said.

Peake said Perez has been "counseled" and is "extremely apologetic." Aikele said Perez remains in her job.

But Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) picking up the torch, is not reassured. And in a letter to Peake today, he calls for an investigation of the email, whether Perez's suggestion was followed, and a look at the numbers of PTSD diagnoses to see whether it really was so isolated of an occurrence. The letter is below.

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Yesterday, NBC reported that the U.S. had finally cut off ties to Ahmed Chalabi because of "unauthorized" contacts with Iranian officials. Newsweek reported the same today, but said that Nouri al-Maliki's government had acted first. McClatchy's take is even clearer:

A State Department official said that this time the U.S. cut off Chalabi, who was appointed in September to head Maliki's Services Committee, which is meant to help usher services into communities after they're secured by U.S. and Iraqi troops, in deference to Maliki.

"Maliki has effectively de-horsed him and asked us to maintain a similar position," said the official, who requested anonymity to discuss sensitive interchanges with the Iraqi government. "My sense is that Maliki wants to marginalize and diminish Chalabi because he sees him as a pretender to the throne."

OK, that's it! Let no one say that the administration has not handled the situation with its typical forbearance and caution. Other, rasher leaders would have shunned Ahmad Chalabi after it became apparent that his network of informants were liars and that he could not be trusted. But the U.S. has not been overly swift to act. Sure, there were suspicions that he had passed classified information to Iran, but this is not a group that rushes to judgment.

Now, however, the straw has finally broken the camel's back:

Sources in Baghdad tell NBC News that as of this week American military and civilian officials have cut off all contact with controversial Iraqi politician Ahmad Chalabi, the former favorite of Washington's once powerful neoconservatives.

The reason, the sources say, is "unauthorized" contacts with Iran's government, an allegation Chalabi denies. Iran has been accused of arming and training rebel Shiite forces in Iraq....

Since September 2007... American military officials and civilian officials working out of the U.S. Embassy had contacts with Chalabi. At that time he was installed as the head of a "services" committee for Baghdad that was to coordinate the restoration of services to the city's residents.

Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, even escorted Chalabi on a trip, on U.S. helicopters, to address reconstruction issues. And American officials attended meetings with him and supported his efforts.

Call it tough love.

Note: By the Charlie Black code of lobbying, it is now not OK to lobby for Ahmed Chalabi.

You'd think that an Iraqi anti-corruption crusader who testified before Congress about his travails would find no great difficulty in obtaining asylum in the United States. You'd think the U.S. would be grateful for the news that $18 billion worth of corruption had virtually "stopped" reconstruction in Iraq. But not so much.

Former State Department officials told Congress earlier this week that, though Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, the former head of the Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, was able to get access into the U.S., he is not allowed to work and is living hand to mouth. Why has he fallen through the cracks?

It's always a toss-up between negligence/incompetence and malfeasance with this administration. On the negligence side of things, you have the disastrously impenetrable immigration system, which has allowed so few Iraqis to come to the U.S. As The New York Times reports today, U.S. soldiers have actually set up organizations to help their interpreters gain asylum, since the Iraqis, even though they face certain threat of death for collaborating with American forces, cannot navigate the system on their own. As one Army captain tells it, interpreters are required to produce a letter from a general, which he said was "like a junior associate at a Fortune 500 company asking the chief executive for a letter of recommendation."

But then there's the malfeasance side of things. One of the former officials testified that "a senior State Department official had ordered agency employees not to give al Radhi references or contact him" for help with his asylum.

That might have a lot to do with the trouble that Radhi gave Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the administration. Like pointing out that corruption ran rampant under Maliki and that he'd jiggered the system so that corruption judges could not bring charges against any of his senior officials without his approval -- that was a decree on which Secretary of State Rice refused to pass judgment when she testified late last year. Rice also refused to comment on Radhi's many accusations.

Sen. Byron Dorgan (D-ND) declared at the hearing early this week that he is "going to ask the State Department what in the hell are they thinking." Somehow I don't think Rice will be any more forthcoming this time around.

In our Pentagon military analyst doc dump thread, Kevin H comes up with a beauty. You can see it here.

In the exchange, someone (the name is redacted) emails public relations officials in the Pentagon with news that Jed Babbin, who was deputy undersecretary of defense in President George H.W. Bush's administration and a participant in the analyst program ("one of our military analysts," the emailer calls him), would be guest hosting the Michael Medved radio show. And Babbin wanted to interview Gen. George Casey, then the commanding officer in Iraq. Babbin is the editor of Human Events.

But just in case Pentagon officials were worried that the interview might not be worth doing, the emailer made the case: "this would be a softball interview and the show is 8th or 9th in the nation."

Allison Barber, a Public Affairs official at the Pentagon, responded quickly:

Thanks for sending this.

Just fyi, probably wouldn't put "softball" interview in writing. If that got out it would compromise jed and general casey.

The emailer, somewhat chastened, replied "check, check." Not bad advice at all.

Note: As for who this emailer is, it's unclear. The Pentagon redacted email addresses in the release, so it could very well be an official in the public affairs office emailing from a private address. The use of the phrase "our military analysts" certainly suggests that.

From the AP:

Arthur Brennan, who briefly served in Baghdad as head of the department's Office of Accountability and Transparency last year, and James Mattil, who worked as the chief of staff, told Senate Democrats on Monday that their office was understaffed and its warnings and recommendations ignored.

Brennan also alleges that the State Department prevented a congressional staffer visiting Baghdad from talking with staffers by insisting they were too busy. In reality, Brennan said, the staffers were watching movies at the embassy and on their computers. The staffers' workload had been cut dramatically because of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's "evisceration" of Iraq's top anti-corruption office, he said.

The State Department's policies "not only contradicted the anti-corruption mission but indirectly contributed to and has allowed corruption to fester at the highest levels of the Iraqi government," Brennan told the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.

As Josh says, we'd like any help we can get finding the revealing tidbits from the Pentagon's military analyst documents. The documents are here. Please provide a link to the pdf you are referring to, as well as the page number when you comment below.

And for those of you who haven't heard the audio of the analyst briefing on April 18, 2006, don't miss it.

Last month, The New York Times published its front-page exposé of the Pentagon's strategy of using military analysts. The retired officers who frequently appeared on TV were the ideal vehicle to broadcast the administration's message on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Message force multipliers," Pentagon officials called them.

Well, earlier this week, the Pentagon released all of the documents that had been turned over to the Times. It is a staggering load. But most immediately intriguing is audio of some of the briefings at the Pentagon, including two featuring Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

The audio we've excerpted here comes from a meeting on April 18, 2006. It was an emergency meeting called because earlier in the month, several retired generals had hit the airwaves demanding that Rumsfeld resign. 17 analysts attended the briefing, which featured Rumsfeld and then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Peter Pace. It was a remarkable display of servility, with one analyst at one point proclaiming that Rumsfeld need to get out there on the "offense," because "we'd love to be following our leader, as indeed you are. You are the leader. You are our guy." Here's the audio:

Another analyst chimed in to the effect that, though PsyOps or "brainwashing" are dirty words, it was necessary to get out there on offense. "You know what they call PsyOps today, they call those public relations firms," another said approvingly. Finally, Rumsfeld had to throw up his hands: "You people should be taking notes. I'm taking all the notes!" It sure was an eager group.

A transcript is available here (pdf) for those who want to follow along at home. The excerpt above begins at the bottom of page 18. It cuts at one point to the top of page 20. The full audio of the briefing is here (wav).

Unfortunately, the transcript does not name the analysts when they speak (it just says "Question"), meaning that it is not easily possible to figure out which of them said what. A list of the participants, however, is here.

The Times reported that the meeting was a rousing success for the Pentagon:

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Earlier this week, I noted an excerpt from the new book by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, where he told how Donald Rumsfeld had ordered a report by the Joint Warfighting Center of the bungled occupation of Iraq, but when Rumsfeld got the results, he'd ordered it squelched.

Sanchez writes that he was told by one of the people who'd done the study that when they'd presented their findings to Rumsfeld, he'd "just shut us down" and said "This is not going anywhere." According to Sanchez, the report validated his account that the entire Pentagon leadership knew that he'd had inadequate support when he'd been in command of the U.S. forces in Iraq after the fall of Hussein. It also showed that Gen. Tommy Franks had discarded the original plan, which called for a twelve-to-eighteen-month occupation deployment.

Sanchez added: "From that, my belief was that Rumsfeld's intent appeared to be to minimize and control further exposure within the Pentagon and to specifically keep this information from the American public."

Susanne Moore, media operations chief at the Joint Forces Command, told me today that the report actually had been finished and published in late 2006 -- but that it "was and remains classified."

So why is a historical report classified? "It has all the earmarks of an abusive classification," Steve Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists' Secrecy Project, told me. "The report has been publicly characterized as an embarrassing document, and an allegation has been made by an informed source that the motive for withholding was to avoid embarrassment and disgrace, which of course is not a legitimate use of the classification system. So it demands further investigation by Congress to get to the bottom of it."

Five years after the invasion of Iraq, there seems to have been a rash of accounting lately.

Consider: in March, the Joint Forces Command released (after a pathetic attempt at squelching it) a report definitively proving that there were no operational links between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Al Qaeda. That same month, The New York Times provided a detailed account of Paul Bremer's infamous decision to disband the Iraqi Army. And then of course there's Doug Feith's book, which purports to show how things would have gone so much better if everyone had just listened to Doug Feith -- a thesis that's necessarily met incredulity in a number of brutal interviews.

Some of this is just because enough time has passed that the players feel safe giving interviews. But then there's also the case of suppressed information that's finally seeing the light of day. In February, for example, the Times revealed that a 2005 report by the publicly-funded RAND Corporation had been buried because its conclusions were inconvenient. The report faulted just about everyone in the administration for not adequately preparing for securing postwar Iraq.

And here's what appears to be another example of a buried report. Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq from the beginning of the occupation until 2004, has written a memoir. And he has a couple scores to settle. One, to be sure, is that he thinks he was scapegoated for the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The other has to do with how he was left in command of Iraq with far too few troops.

In an excerpt from the book published in Time, Sanchez tells how Rumsfeld, two years after that disastrous year in Iraq, called Sanchez into his office to try to diffuse blame. Rumsfeld hadn't known that Sanchez, commander of the Army's V Corps, was left in charge while CENTCOM and CFLCC [coalition land forces] staffs had pulled out, he said, and he'd written a memo of that official version to prove it.

But Sanchez wasn't buying it, he writes, and told Rumsfeld, "I just can't believe you didn't know." Rumsfeld flipped out. The meeting ended, Sanchez writes, with Rumsfeld saying that he was going to order a report to find out what happened. But that didn't go so well:

[Adm. Ed Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs] assigned the task to the Joint Warfighting Center and gave them a pretty tight timeline. So it wasn't long before I was giving the investigative team a complete rundown of everything that had happened in Iraq between May and June 2003. I later learned that Gen. Tommy Franks, however, had refused to speak with them.

A few months later, I was making a presentation at the Joint Warfighting Center and ran across several of the people involved with the study. "Say, did you guys ever complete that investigation?" I asked.

"Oh, yes sir. We sure did," came the reply. "And let me tell you, it was ugly."

"Ugly?" I asked.

"Yes, sir. Our report validated everything you told us -- that Franks issued the orders to discard the original twelve-to-eighteen-month occupation deployment, that the forces were drawing down, that we were walking away from the mission, and that everybody knew about it. And let me tell you, the Secretary did not like that one bit. After we went in to brief him, he just shut us down. 'This is not going anywhere,' he said. 'Oh, and by the way, leave all the copies right here and don't talk to anybody about it.'"

"You mean he embargoed all the copies of the report?" I asked.

"Yes, sir, he did."

From that, my belief was that Rumsfeld's intent appeared to be to minimize and control further exposure within the Pentagon and to specifically keep this information from the American public.

Update: Here's William Arkin's take on Sanchez.

The Pentagon was shocked by what it read in the paper last Sunday.

From Stars and Stripes:

The Defense Department has temporarily stopped feeding information to retired military officers pending a review of the issue, said Robert Hastings, principal deputy assistant secretary of Defense for public affairs....

Hastings said he is concerned about allegations that the Defense Department's relationship with the retired military analysts was improper.

"Following the allegations, the story that is printed in the New York Times, I directed my staff to halt, to suspend the activities that may be ongoing with retired military analysts to give me time to review the situation," Hastings said in an interview with Stripes on Friday.

Hastings said he did not discuss the matter with Defense Secretary Robert Gates prior to making his decision. He could not say Friday how long this review might take.

"We'll take the time to do it right," he said.

Georgetown students will no longer have the benefit of Douglas Feith's insights into international law, his talent for seeing connections where others do not, or his ability to pack a PowerPoint presentation with punch. That's because his time there is up:

Asked about Feith's status, Robert Gallucci, dean of Georgetown's foreign service school, told us that when Feith was hired -- something that caused an uproar among the faculty -- it was understood he "was on a two-year appointment." Any decision not to renew should not be seen as "a judgment on his performance," Gallucci said, noting that Feith's students' "course evaluations were really good."

Feith, author of a bestseller about his Pentagon days called "War and Decision," said he hadn't decided what to do next. "I'm intensely occupied with book stuff," and there are "several things I'm thinking about," he said.

Word is that keeping Feith on beyond the two-year term again would have infuriated a number of faculty members.

From the AP:

Under pressure to increase their numbers, the Army and Marine Corps are sharply raising the number of recruits with felony convictions they are admitting to the services.

Data released by a congressional committee shows that the number of soldiers admitted to the Army with felony records jumped from 249 in 2006 to 511 in 2007. And the number of Marines with felonies rose from 208 to 350.

You can see a breakdown of the numbers by service and felony released by the House oversight committee here (pdf).

I suppose it was always the case that when top military professionals speak frankly about a war, it makes headlines. Still, given Gen. David Petraeus' famously obtuse presentation to Congress last week, this recent report (pdf) from the National Defense University by Joseph Collins, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in the Pentagon until 2004, couldn't provide a starker contrast. It is titled "Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath," and it begins:

Measured in blood and treasure, the war in Iraq has achieved the status of a major war and a major debacle. As of fall 2007, this conflict has cost the United States over 3,800 dead and over 28,000 wounded. Allied casualties accounted for another 300 dead. Iraqi civilian deaths--mostly at the hands of other Iraqis--may number as high as 82,000. Over 7,500 Iraqi soldiers and police officers have also been killed. Fifteen percent of the Iraqi population has become refugees or displaced persons. The Congressional Research Service estimates that the United States now spends over $10 billion per month on the war, and that the total, direct U.S. costs from March 2003 to July 2007 have exceeded $450 billion, all of which has been covered by deficit spending. No one as yet has calculated the costs of long-term veterans' benefits or the total impact on Service personnel and materiel.

The war's political impact also has been great. Globally, U.S. standing among friends and allies has fallen.2 Our status as a moral leader has been damaged by the war, the subsequent occupation of a Muslim nation, and various issues concerning the treatment of detainees. At the same time, operations in Iraq have had a negative impact on all other efforts in the war on terror, which must bow to the priority of Iraq when it comes to manpower, materiel, and the attention of decisionmakers. Our Armed Forces-- especially the Army and Marine Corps--have been severely strained by the war in Iraq. Compounding all of these problems, our efforts there were designed to enhance U.S. national security, but they have become, at least temporarily, an incubator for terrorism and have emboldened Iran to expand its influence throughout the Middle East.

As this case study is being written, despite impressive progress in security during the surge, the outcome of the war is in doubt. Strong majorities of both Iraqis and Americans favor some sort of U.S. withdrawal. Intelligence analysts, however, remind us that the only thing worse than an Iraq with an American army may be an Iraq after the rapid withdrawal of that army.... No one has calculated the psychopolitical impact of a perceived defeat on the U.S. reputation for power or the future of the overall war on terror. For many analysts (including this one), Iraq remains a "must win," but for many others, despite the obvious progress under General David Petraeus and the surge, it now looks like a "can't win."

After all that talk, finally a decision. Behold, America, your new (sort of) way forward in Iraq:

President Bush plans to announce today that he will cut Army combat tours in Iraq from 15 months to 12 months, returning rotations to where they were before last year's troop buildup in an effort to alleviate the tremendous stress on the military, administration officials said.

The move is in response to intense pressure from service commanders who have expressed anxiety about the toll of long deployments on their soldiers and, more broadly, about the U.S. military's ability to confront unanticipated threats. Bush will announce the decision during a national speech, in which aides said he will also embrace Army Gen. David H. Petraeus's plan to indefinitely suspend a drawdown of forces.

The twin decisions may set the course for U.S. policy in Iraq through the fall and perhaps for the rest of Bush's presidency....

The bottom line seems to be that after pulling out the extra forces Bush sent last year, the United States will keep about 140,000 troops in Iraq at least through the November presidential election....

But Bush's decision will affect only those troops sent to Iraq as of Aug. 1 or later, meaning that those already there still have to complete 15-month tours. Bobby Muller, president of Veterans for America, an advocacy group, said that nearly half of the Army's active-duty frontline units are currently deployed for 15 months, and that Bush's decision leaves them out.

And how will you know whether things are going well, well enough to expect any troop withdrawals before the end of the year? As Gen. David Petraeus made abundantly clear this week, it's not clear. It's a lack of clarity shared at the highest levels of the administration:

A senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the administration had abandoned the benchmarks [Congress set for Iraq] as a strict standard of progress because establishing a secure Iraq would also depend on factors other than political and military progress.

Over two days of testimony, General Petraeus repeatedly was asked to explain the conditions that would allow further withdrawals, but he answered that they were not based on some easily defined measurements.

Asked for elaboration, the senior administration official said, "It's a very hard concept to explain publicly because it doesn't feature a sort of setting of the dial. It features what we call a running assessment."

Bush is set to speak at 11:30 this morning.

Of all the innumerable times that lawmakers asked Gen. David Petraeus over the last two days for some indication of what success in Iraq is, this answer seemed as clear as any of them. At least in this answer, there was no reference to success being "conditions-based" or any mention of "battlefield geometry." Rep. Robert Wexler (D-FL) asked "Please tell us, general, what is winning?"

"Ambassador Crocker and I, for what it's worth, have typically seen ourselves as minimalists. We're not after the Holy Grail in Iraq, we're not after Jeffersonian democracy," Petraeus responded. "We're after conditions that would allow our soldiers to disengage."

For those who've been watching the Iraq debate, this sort of "minimalism" is nothing new. After all, administration officials have been saying since the start that a "Jeffersonian democracy" isn't likely to take root in Iraq (even Paul Bremer said "We're not going to have a Jeffersonian democracy here" in 2003). But with Iraq, there never can be enough minimalism.

Transcript of the full exchange is below.

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Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) finally got his turn during today's Senate foreign relations committtee hearing and used it to question Ambassador Crocker and Gen. Petraeus on what "success" would be in Iraq, focusing on the strength of Al Qaeda in Iraq and Iranian influence as key benchmarks.

After questions about the status quo in Iraq of these two areas, Obama proceeded to ask Crocker and Petraeus whether that status quo could be called success if maintained without such a high level of U.S. troops in Iraq.

Here's video of Obama's questions:

His point, he said, was that the "definition of success is so high," such as wiping out AQI and eliminating any undue Iranian influence, then success would be unattainable. But that if the criteria for success was a "messy, sloppy status quo," not dissimilar to the current state of affairs, though without U.S. troops holding the country together, then that was attainable.

Such a state of affairs, Obama said, could be achieved with "measured, but increased pressure" on the Iraqis via troop withdrawals (he was keen to point out that "nobody is asking for a precipitous withdrawal") and a "diplomatic surge" in the region.

Here's video of Obama's conclusion:

"Our resources are finite," he said, and "when you have finite resources, you have to define goals tightly and modestly."

Crocker generally agreed with Obama's definition of success in Iraq ("this is hard and this is complicated"), though he did not stipulate to Obama's somewhat more modest characterization of what success would look like.

Text of Obama's comments below.

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Sen. Richard Lugar (R-IN), the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, immediately cast a different tone on the Republican side than the one that prevailed throughout the earlier hearing, led by the ranking member on that committee, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ).

Earlier, McCain started from the assumption of what success means and seemed to take for granted the means of achieving it. Lugar's take was much different.

In his opening statement, Lugar offered a sweeping analysis of the situation in Iraq and concluded that today's hearing was actually much different than the one held last September:

At that time, the President was appealing to Congress to allow the surge to continue to create breathing space for a political accommodation. Today the questions are whether and how improvements in security can be converted into political gains that can stabilize Iraq despite the impending drawdown of U.S. troops. Simply appealing for more time to make progress is insufficient. The debate over how much progress we have made and whether we can make more is less illuminating than determining whether the Administration has a definable political strategy that recognizes the time limitations we face and seeks a realistic outcome designed to protect American vital interests.

At the moment, according to Lugar, the administration clearly has no "definable political strategy." He looks forward, he said, to discussing with Petraeus and Crocker "how the United States can define success and then achieve our vital objectives in Iraq."

Towards the end of this morning's Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Sen. Evan Bayh (D-IN) elicited the plainest assessment yet of the day from Gen. Petraeus.

Given the complexity of the situation in Iraq, Bayh wanted to know, "isn't it true that a fair amount of humility is in order in rendering judgments about the way forward in Iraq, that no one can speak with great confidence about what is likely to occur?"

Petraeus seemed to grow a bit irritated at the insinuation that he'd been painting an overly rosy picture. "It's why I've repeatedly noted that we haven't turned any corners, we haven't seen any lights at the end of the tunnel. The champagne bottle has been pushed to the back of the refrigerator. And the progress, while real, is fragile and is reversible," he replied.

Later, Petraeus again refused to venture any guess about when there might be further drawdowns of troops from Iraq after July.

A transcript of the exchange is below.

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Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) took her time today to begin with a statement emphasizing the toll the war is taking on the U.S. armed forces, a cost, she said, that ought to be weighed against the cost of staying in Iraq indefinitely. "It's time to begin the orderly process of removing our troops."

Here's video of that:

Clinton began by focusing her questioning on the coming long-term security agreement between Iraq and the U.S. Earlier in the hearing, Ambassador Ryan Crocker had been at pains to stress that "the agreement will not establish permanent bases in Iraq" and might actually prohibit them (whatever that is worth), and that the "agreement will not specify troop levels" or "tie the hands of the next administration." But the agreement would not go to Congress, he said.

Clinton, who's been pushing legislation that would force the administration to submit the agreement to the Senate, as is required of formal treaties, said that "seems odd to Americans," for the administration to cut such a deal without Congressional consent -- at the same time that the Iraqis might submit the agreement to its parliament.

Clinton also wanted to know what conditions might possibly have existed that would have caused Petraeus to not extend the current strategy. Petraeus answered by ticking off the factors involved in deciding, but added that "it's not a mathematical exercise."

Here are Clinton's questions:

Update: Transcript of Sen. Clinton's exchange with Petraeus and Crocker:

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Even more than Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT), Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) found it impossible to suppress his admiration for Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Petraeus deserves that fifth star, Graham said, and Crocker (who has devoted his career to public service in the Middle East) should go someplace not horrible (presumably far away from the Middle East):

Graham's comments:

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Gen. David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker have given an overall positive review of U.S. progress in Iraq today, but both have laden those statements with clear caveats. When asked about political reconciliation in Iraq, Crocker has tended to prefer characterizing it as "moving in the right direction."

But Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) thinks that all too much emphasis has been put on the caveats. Clearly criticizing the questioning by Democrats today, Lieberman said that "there's a kind of hear no progress in Iraq, see no progress in Iraq, and most of all, speak of no progress in Iraq."

Lieberman, at least, sees no harm in overstating the progress in Iraq: "The Iraqi political leadership has achieved a lot more political reconciliation and progress since September than the American political leadership has."

Finally, he seemed to indicate that if only Democrats would accept the clear success of the surge, we "can move to more success so we can bring more of our troops home."

Thereafter, Lieberman went into a kind of reprise of his questioning last September, wanting to know about Iran's activity in Iraq.

The transcript is below.

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Last time Gen. David Petraeus went up to Capitol Hill to give his big update, he wasn't 100% ready for prime time. That was most evident when Sen. John Warner (R-VA) asked if success in the Iraq war will make America safer. His response was a blunt "I don't know."

Today, Warner gave Petraeus the opportunity for a second bite of the apple. "Is all this sacrifice bringing about a more secure America?" Warner asked. And this time, Petraeus was ready -- with a mind-numbing battery of talking points, from which he was apparently reading:

Finally, Warner had to interrupt Petraeus, saying "my time on the clock is moving pretty quickly. It was a fairly simple question: Does that translate into a greater security for those of us at home?" He wanted an answer "just in simple language."

Finally, Petraeus came back with an assurance that "I do believe it is worth it."

A transcript of the exchange is below.

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