The year's end is a time for remembering -- and we here at TPM are just falling all over ourselves in a general fit of nostalgia. While the Golden Dukes constitute our tribute to the brightest stars in 2007's constellation of muck, there's just too much to commemorate for one website to bear.

Dahlia Lithwick has as good an approach as any over at Slate, celebrating "the Bush administration's dumbest legal arguments of the year." Now, as you can imagine, these arguments are not simply singled out for their stupidity. They are honored for their brazen opposition to common sense and the facts.

The administration's gravest offenses get special billing: "The United States does not torture" gets number one. And "the NSA's eavesdropping was limited in scope," kicks off the countdown.

But while the gravity of those assertions makes me question whether they can be described as "dumb," there are plenty of truly stupid legal arguments to go around: "The vice president's office is not a part of the executive branch" and "Everyone who has ever spoken to the president about anything is barred from congressional testimony by executive privilege," for example. And fittingly enough, "Alberto Gonzales" gets number three on the top-ten list, special recognition for a man who not only parroted a vast catalog of stupid and/or dishonest arguments, but looked dumb doing it.

Enjoy. We'll miss you 2007! But not to worry, as long as Dick Cheney -- and especially David Addington, who has a genius for dumb legal arguments -- remain in office, 2008 won't disappoint.

Note: Dahlia´s list is perfect as is, and she had to stop somewhere. But the White House's desperate efforts to keep the Secret Service's visitor logs secret deserve a special commendation for stupidity. Readers are invited to nominate others.

Who murdered Benazir Bhutto? U.S. authorities don't know. They may never know. And they're not ruling anything in or out.

To recap our debate yesterday, the first-blush assessment from most experts held that al-Qaeda is responsible. Others, including political adversaries of Pervez Musharraf, then suggested Musharraf's government was at least culpable, given the porousness of security Bhutto received in the garrison city of Rawalpindi where she was assassinated. Still others caution that Pakistani Islamic terrorist groups with agendas distinct from al-Qaeda's might be more likely candidates.

That appears to still be the lay of the land. Bhutto's party, the Pakistan People's Party, is demanding an official inquiry, though it's unclear (to me at least) whether Musharraf has agreed to one. But here's one development to watch in the event of a probe. In the Los Angeles Times, Josh Meyer reports that Pakistan hasn't yet replied to U.S. investigators who've offered to help.

Some U.S. intelligence experts and analysts said that there are so many tangled alliances between the extremist groups and Pakistani government agencies that it would be virtually impossible to get to the bottom of who killed Bhutto unless the perpetrators came forward -- with proof. The FBI has offered to send investigators, but Pakistan has not responded, FBI spokesman Richard Kolko said.

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The Ramones once implored us not to fight on Christmas. But the Turkish general staff doesn't like the Ramones. Nor, to understate matters, does it like the Kurdish terror group known as the PKK. With the approval of the U.S. to violate Iraqi airspace, Turkish warplanes and invasion forces have killed an estimated 150 Kurds in the last week-plus, according to the Turkish military. The New York Times:

Turkey’s assertions came as Kurdish and American officials said that Turkish jets crossed into Iraqi airspace again on Tuesday, in what American officials said was the fourth such flight over the border in two weeks.

Turkish officials did not comment on claims that it flew into Iraq on Tuesday, but confirmed that it had carried out an air and ground operation early Tuesday on its side of the border in southeastern Turkey. An army statement said five rebels were killed, including two women, part of a rebel group preparing an attack.

None of these raids could have occurred without the support of the United States, which controls Iraqi airspace. At the risk of inducing strategic vertigo, here are the stakes. Turkey is a crucial NATO ally, and the major launching point for all U.S. air cargo into Iraq. It fought a war against the PKK in the 1990s, since it thinks that the strength of the PKK bolsters the desire for independence in Turkey's heavily-Kurdish southeast. Plus it says to George W. Bush that the PKK are terrorists -- rather truthfully -- the U.S. is fighting its own war on terrorists, it's all one fight, etc. So we're helping them. And how!

Rear Adm. Greg Smith, director of communications for the American-led forces in Iraq, said Turkey had notified American officials in advance of the latest raid, as is customary, telling them it was a reconnaissance flight, not a strike mission.

“They tell us where they are going and what their mission is,” he said. “The first three missions were all identified as strike missions. They said their intentions were to go and drop ordnance and they told us that at the time.”

“On this occasion they told us it was a reconnaissance mission,” he continued. However, he confirmed that while the Americans monitor all such Turkish flights, they would not necessarily know if, having crossed the border, the Turkish pilots changed their mission from reconnaissance to bombing.

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For two years, military officials, defense experts, lawyers and Iraqi officials tried to warn the U.S. against relying so heavily on unaccountable private security contractors in Iraq. Until Blackwater's fateful September shooting at Nisour Square, the U.S. answer was always the same: meh. One reason the Pentagon didn't care: one of its chief advisers on security contractors was on the contractors' payroll.

Steve Fainaru of The Washington Post -- who's dogged Blackwater ever since the shooting -- delivers a taxonomy of unheeded warnings. The pattern is fairly simple, and rather Blackwater-specific. (The Blackwater brand has become a generic signifier for security contractors in Iraq -- the Q-Tip or Kleenex of contract security.) Blackwater's guards shoot someone. People complain. They warn that impunity for security contractors jeopardizes the U.S. mission. U.S. officials do nothing. Nothing changes. More Iraqis get shot. Repeat. T.X. Hammes, a top-shelf counterinsurgency expert and ex-adviser to the Iraqi army training mission, told Fainaru, "I still think, from a pure counterinsurgency standpoint, armed contractors are an inherently bad idea, because you cannot control the quality, you cannot control the action on the ground, but you're held responsible for everything they do."

So why did it take widespread Iraqi outrage over the Nisour Square debacle for anything to change? One reason, Fainaru reports, is a man named Lawrence W. Peter. The Pentagon allowed the security contractors to regulate and police themselves. Peter, a Pentagon consultant, helped keep it that way. Only while he delivered that advice, he worked for a security contractors' lobby.

U.S. officials often turned to the Private Security Company Association of Iraq, a trade group funded by the security companies. Lawrence T. Peter, a retired Navy intelligence officer, served as the association's director while also working as a consultant to the Pentagon's Defense Reconstruction Support Office, which administers contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whitman, the Pentagon spokesman, said Peter earned "a few thousand dollars a year" as a consultant.

The association operated out of an office inside the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Logistics Directorate in the Green Zone. Jack Holly, a retired Marine colonel who heads corps logistics in Iraq, said that Peter and the association play "a critical role to help the private security community improve and regulate itself," adding, "They tried to fill a void that had been left by the U.S. government's failure to recognize the problem."

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A lot of people want to talk to John Kiriakou. After the leader of the team that interrogated senior al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah in 2002 -- one of the detainees whose interrogation was secretly recorded -- went public, a lot of confusion remained. Did Abu Zubaydah really break after 35 seconds of waterboarding, as Kiriakou said? Or, as the FBI's Dan Coleman and others have said, did Abu Zubaydah's interrogation yield the best information through non-coercive techniques? Very few people are sure of the answer. Many want to ask Kiriakou more questions.

Not least of whom: the Justice Department.

Jonathan Landay of McClatchy reports that the CIA has referred Kiriakou's case to the Justice Department. No, the department isn't investigating whether Kiriakou's role in Abu Zubaydah's interrogation was potentially illegal. That would be an admission that the torture apparatus established after 9/11 is illegal, and you know that Michael Mukasey and Mark Filip can't make up their minds about that. Rather, the FBI wants to know if Kiriakou criminally disclosed classified information by speaking to ABC News about the interrogation.

What's more, Kiriakou's former employer, the CIA -- which surely wasn't happy about seeing Kiriakou confirm on TV that his team waterboarded Abu Zubaydah and then call waterboarding torture -- won't confirm that it dimed him out.

A CIA spokesman declined to comment when asked if the agency had sought a criminal probe of Kiriakou. But the spokesman, George Little, added, "Separate and apart from any specific instance, when the agency has reason to believe there has been a possible violation of the law, such as the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, it has an obligation to refer the matter to the Department of Justice."

Quoth Kiriakou's attorney, Mark Zaid -- your go-to lawyer if you're a CIA official in legal jeopardy: "it wouldn't surprise me and I wouldn't find it unusual" if the CIA turned around and got Justice to open a criminal investigation into Kiriakou for the disclosure. None dare call it retaliation.

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We all can get along. At least for the time being.

After the House intelligence committee threatened to issue subpoenas yesterday, the Justice Department backed down. Now the CIA will begin forking over documents relating to the destruction of the torture tapes, and the committee will hear from their second witness, the CIA's general counsel John Rizzo.

The DoJ seemed keen to paint Congress' reaction to their letter last Friday as an overreaction. Spokesman Brian Roehrkasse told the New York Times that "the department has 'no desire to block any Congressional investigation' and has not advised the C.I.A. against cooperating with the committee." And the AP relays that Department officials "denied they had changed their stance on the investigation."

And indeed, if you look at their letter to the committee from last Friday, where they "respectfully request" that the committee sit on their thumbs until the DoJ probes into the tapes' destruction wraps up, they have a point. They were just askin'. But somehow the graciousness and subtlety of the letter was lost on the House intelligence committee, who pronounced themselves "stunned" that the Department would move to block their investigation and said that, indeed, they'd been "notified that the Department of Justice has advised CIA not cooperate with our investigation."

Really, if the DoJ was just asking, it should have been pretty clear off the bat that the answer was "no." But apparently the threat of subpoenas was needed to drive the point home.

Now, while The Washington Post, straightforwardly calls this a reversal on the Department's part, the Times hedges, calling it a "partial resolution." Take, for instance, Roehrkasse (take him, please!):

“The wisdom, propriety and appropriateness of the decision to destroy these tapes are worthy and compelling subjects of an oversight investigation,” Mr. Roehrkasse said. But he said officials were still concerned that a Congressional inquiry could cause “disruption of our initial witness interviews, the delay and disruption of our document collection, and the tainting of any future criminal prosecutorial action because of Congressional grants of immunity to witnesses.”

Accordingly, things will get interesting when it comes to Jose Rodriguez, the CIA official who ordered the tapes' destruction. The committee wants to talk to him in January, along with Rizzo. But, with Rodriguez's lawyer crying about witchhunts and scapegoats, that's going to be hairy:

Officials said Mr. Rodriguez’s appearance before the committee might involve complex negotiations over legal immunity at a time when the Justice Department and the intelligence agency were reviewing whether the destruction of the tapes broke any laws.

So enjoy the inter-branch comity while it lasts.

The gang's all here!

Really, can you have a botched cover-up without Alberto Gonzales involved? And how can there be a torture scandal without David Addington's great big mug?

The New York Times reports today that Gonzales and Addington were among the White House lawyers (Harriet Miers was also among them) who advised the CIA on what to do with the torture tapes. What's not entirely clear, however, is what they advised to the CIA to do.

The story up until now had been at least somewhat simple. White House and Justice Department lawyers had been unanimous in their advice: do not destroy the tapes. But those in the camp of Jose Rodriguez, the former CIA operations chief who gave the order to destroy the tapes, have said that the White House's advice wasn't unequivocal ("They never told us 'Hell, no'"). For lack of any clear directives or advice from on high, Rodriguez had them destroyed.

But now the story gets murkier:

One former senior intelligence official with direct knowledge of the matter said there had been “vigorous sentiment” among some top White House officials to destroy the tapes. The former official did not specify which White House officials took this position, but he said that some believed in 2005 that any disclosure of the tapes could have been particularly damaging after revelations a year earlier of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Some other officials assert that no one at the White House advocated destroying the tapes. Those officials acknowledged, however, that no White House lawyer gave a direct order to preserve the tapes or advised that destroying them would be illegal.

The Times can't hope to sort all this out, only reporting that there are "conflicting accounts." Thankfully, Newsweek has reported that there is "an extensive paper—or e-mail—trail" of all this back and forth. So at least investigators have that going for them (of course, it depends on who's investigating).

And to add to the murk, ass-saving, and back-biting, the Times reports that the CIA lawyers who gave Rodriguez the legal green light didn't really mean it to be the green light. After he was given written advice by two lawyers, Steven Hermes and Robert Eatinger, that "he had the authority to destroy the tapes and that the destruction would violate no laws," he went ahead. But:

Current and former officials said the two lawyers informed the C.I.A.’s top lawyer, John A. Rizzo, about the legal advice they had provided. But officials said Mr. Rodriguez did not inform either Mr. Rizzo or Porter J. Goss, the C.I.A. director, before he sent the cable to destroy the tapes.

“There was an expectation on the part of those providing legal guidance that additional bases would be touched,” said one government official with knowledge of the matter. “That didn’t happen.”

Robert S. Bennett, a lawyer for Mr. Rodriguez, insisted that his client had done nothing wrong and suggested that Mr. Rodriguez had been authorized to order the destruction of the tapes. “He had a green light to destroy them,” Mr. Bennett said.

So to sum up: after three years of apparently contradictory and equivocal advice from both the CIA and top levels of the government, Rodriguez finally destroyed the tapes after receiving legal advice that he could. But the lawyers who told him that say he should have touched "additional bases" before he did. And none of this explains why the CIA and the administration kept the tapes secret for three years, possibly criminally obstructing multiple investigations.

Abu Zubaydah was:

A) A high-ranking Al Qaeda operative who largely confounded U.S. interrogators with his literary and tactical genius until they submitted him to waterboarding and other forms of torture. After that, he provided key information that likely preempted future attacks.

B) A low-ranking and mentally ill Al Qaeda operative who provided valuable information under gentle questioning, but whose confessions made under torture were useless. Much of the threat information he provided was "crap."

A is the CIA's version (and the President's). B is the FBI's. And in today's Washington Post, Dan Eggen and Walter Pincus walk through the competing profiles. Zubaydah, remember, was one of the two detainees whose interrogations appeared on the destroyed CIA tapes.

It's clear off the bat that the version of events provided by John Kiriakou, the former CIA agent who launched something like a PR blitz last week, is not quite right. In his telling, Zubaydah held out until waterboarded; after only 35 seconds of that, he gave in and "from that day on, he answered every question."

By contrast, both CIA and FBI agents tell the Post that he provided valuable information before he was waterboarded. And there wasn't just one session: "Instead, [other former and current officials] said, harsh tactics used on him at a secret detention facility in Thailand went on for weeks or, depending on the account, even months."

And then you get to the real discrepancies.

A CIA agent says that Zubaydah was a "wily adversary" under questioning who seemed "very selective in what he protected and what he gave up."

Retired FBI agent Daniel Coleman, "who led an examination of documents after Abu Zubaida's capture in early 2002 and worked on the case," responded that Zubaydah was talking before he was waterboarded, but the CIA agents couldn't believe that he knew so little.

Coleman, in fact, emerges as an effective foil to Kiriakou (who, incidentally, participated in the capture of Zubaydah but wasn't present during the torture) in the piece. Coleman says that Zubaydah was a "safehouse keeper" for Al Qaeda who had suffered a serious head injury years earlier.

Zubaydah's mental instability was manifest in his diary, Coleman says, which was "written in three distinct personalities -- one younger, one older and one the same age as Abu Zubaida. The book was full of flowery and philosophical meanderings, and made little mention of terrorism or al-Qaeda."

Former CIA Director George Tenet, by contrast, writes in his book that Zubaydah used a "sophisticated literary device to express himself" in the diary.

And you get the impression that Tenet's reading is typical of the way the CIA agents tended to see Zubaydah:

Coleman said reports of Abu Zubaida's statements during his early, traditional interrogation were "consistent with who he was and what he would possibly know." He and other officials said that materials seized from Abu Zubaida's house and other locations, including names, telephone numbers and computer laptops, provided crucial information about al-Qaeda and its network.

But, Coleman and other law enforcement officials said, CIA officials concluded to the contrary that Abu Zubaida was a major player, and they saw any lack of information as evidence that he was resisting interrogation. Much of the threat information provided by Abu Zubaida, Coleman said, "was crap."

"There's an agency mind-set that there was always some sort of golden apple out there, but there just isn't, especially with guys like him," Coleman said.

Note: This tidbit reported by Newsweek last week seems worth noting here:

[The interrogation of Zubaydah] sparked an internal battle within the U.S. intelligence community after FBI agents angrily protested the aggressive methods that were used. In addition to waterboarding, Zubaydah was subjected to sleep deprivation and bombarded with blaring rock music by the Red Hot Chili Peppers. One agent was so offended he threatened to arrest the CIA interrogators, according to two former government officials directly familiar with the dispute.

Update: Here's Ron Suskind, the author of The One Percent Doctrine and who first reported what FBI agents were saying about Zubaydah, talking to Salon last year.

"It smells like the coverup of the coverup."

That's Rep. Jane Harman's (D-CA) take. And Rep. Pete Hoekstra's (R-MI) wasn't any different.

In case you were already out the door late Friday afternoon when the news broke, the Justice Department, along with the CIA's inspector general, informed the House intelligence committee that they'd told the CIA not to cooperate with the committee's investigation into the CIA's torture tapes. Congress would just have to wait until the joint Justice Department-CIA probe was done (when? who knows) before they got any answers. The reason given was that it would "jeopardize" the Justice Department's investigation if the CIA gave the committee all the information it wanted while at the same time cooperating with the DoJ inquiry.

Chairman Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) and Hoekstra pronounced themselves "stunned." There's "no basis" for the DoJ to do that, they said. Harman, the former ranking member on the committee, said the same yesterday.

The ground is being laid for an ol' fashioned separation-of-powers showdown. Hoekstra went further, saying "I think we will issue subpoenas." With Republican backup, it should prove pretty easy for Reyes to pull the trigger. Hoekstra even singled out CIA Director Mike Hayden, promising to hold him "accountable."

And remember, Hoekstra and Reyes weren't the only lawmakers Michael Mukasey's Justice Department upset on Friday. Mukasey sent a friendly none-of-your-business letter in response to the Senate Judiciary Committee's questions about the CIA tapes. Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) was "disappointed" and promised to make that clear when Mukasey appeared before his committee in the new year.

At this point, it's worth observing that Michael Mukasey has been on the job as attorney general barely a month and has already united both parties in Congress against him. That's some quick work.

But wait! The Department also argued Friday that a federal judge should not hold a hearing on the tapes, saying that a hearing would be "both unnecessary and potentially disruptive.” Lawyers representing 12 detainees at Guantanamo had asked for one. Is a three branches free-for-all in the works?

And here you thought Stuart Bowen was a paragon of integrity.

Bowen is the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). Despite being an old buddy of George W. Bush's back in the Texas days, Bowen has earned a reputation as a tireless investigator of waste, fraud and abuse in Iraq contracting.

The quarterly reports issued by SIGIR have not hesitated to name names of both crooked contractors and crooked contracting officials. Bowen's appearances on Capitol Hill have been remarkably candid and free of euphemism. When I was in Baghdad in March, military public-affairs officers jumped at the chance to show me how they interface with SIGIR and boasted of the enormous respect they have for an office that's all up in their business.

But now, reports The Washington Post, the worm has turned. SIGIR faces four separate investigations -- including one by a federal grand jury -- looking into everything from its own profligacy to its alleged abundance of ego:

Current and former employees have complained about overtime policies that allowed 10 staff members to earn more than $250,000 each last year. They have questioned the oversight of a $3.5 million book project about Iraq's reconstruction modeled after the 9/11 Commission report. And they have alleged that Bowen and his deputy have improperly snooped into their staff's e-mail messages.

The employee allegations have prompted four government probes into the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), including an investigation by the FBI and federal prosecutors into the agency's financial practices and claims of e-mail monitoring, according to law enforcement sources and SIGIR staff members. Federal prosecutors have presented evidence of alleged wrongdoing to a grand jury in Virginia, which has subpoenaed SIGIR for thousands of pages of financial documents, contracts, personnel records and correspondence, several sources familiar with the probe said.

Bowen, with no evident irony, dismisses many of the charges as the result of "disgruntled" employees. Yet some of the overtime that certain SIGIR officials have racked up is downright gaudy (1400 hours?).

One SIGIR official spoke anonymously of a climate of fear that pervades the office. SIGIR's chiefs are "gripped by paranoia. It's almost a siege mentality." Such alleged paranoia, according to federal prosecutors, has led top officials to illegally snoop on their employees. One of them, Ginger Cruz, Bowen's deputy, allegedly used, um, witchcraft to intimidate subordinates:

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When it comes to torture, it's the system.

Today's New York Times carries a valuable analysis by Scott Shane running through how the revelation of the destroyed CIA torture tapes underscores the agency's fears of having the administration turn on it. That is, after manipulating the law to justify ordering the CIA's torture of Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and other al-Qaeda detainees, the Bush administration might finally prosecute someone low on the CIA food chain for doing what they ordered him or her to do. The agency watched Donald Rumsfeld, William Haynes and Ricardo Sanchez walk while Lynndie England and Charles Graner took the fall for Abu Ghraib. No one wants to be the Lynndie England of the Black Sites.

The administration hasn't gone down this road yet. But, from the CIA's perspective, the destruction of the tapes might bring it dangerously close. After all, if the Justice Department-CIA probe finds that Jose Rodriguez committed a crime by destroying evidence when he had the tapes junked, it raises the question of what those tapes contained evidence of. There are reams of evidence -- legal guidance from John Yoo, for instance, some still classified -- of what the underlying crime is.

So how does the CIA get out of it? Why, blame the system. Consider this passage from Shane:

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Maybe it was all a big misunderstanding.

Yesterday, The New York Times reported that the White House and Justice Department had advised against destroying the interrogation videotapes of -- but CIA officials said that advice was less than direct (of the "probably wouldn't be a good idea" variety). As Newsweek reports, that seems to have been the pattern for CIA, White House, and Justice Department officials who failed to unequivocally direct that the tapes be preserved. (For those who haven't already, check out our monster timeline telling the tale of the tapes.)

Thankfully for investigators, "an extensive paper—or e-mail—trail exists documenting the contacts between [the CIA's] Clandestine Service officials and top agency managers and between the CIA and the White House regarding what to do about the tapes." Both directors of the CIA during that time, George Tenet and Porter Goss, were no more explicit, only indicating "that they believed it would be unwise to destroy the tapes." The CIA's general counsel is characterized as "never comfortable with the idea of the tapes being destroyed."

The discussions about the comfortability and wisdom of destroying the tapes unfolded in "fits and starts" between 2003 and late 2005, the mag reports, when Jose Rodriguez of the Clandestine Service made the clear and irrevocable decision that the tapes should be destroyed. That move came after a lawyer in the Clandestine Service advised that "there is no explicit legal reason why the Clandestine Service had to preserve the tapes." But a source whispers to Newsweek that the advice did not "directly authorize the tapes' destruction or offer advice on the wisdom or folly of such a course of action." I guess the joke's on Rodriguez.

Newsweek provides a little more detail about the tapes. For the entirety of their existence, they were kept in a secret location overseas, where they were eventually destroyed. At one point "portions... were electronically transmitted to CIA headquarters," but those traces have likely been rubbed out. Finally, there's a "detailed written transcript of the tapes' contents," which apparently still exists.

All of this, of course, doesn't do anything to explain why the tapes -- or their descriptions -- were kept from those seeking them, including the 9/11 commission and a federal judge.

And now there's a paper trail in the saga of the CIA's destroyed interrogation videotapes. A former senior intelligence official tells The New York Times's Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane that lawyers within the agency's clandestine wing advised Jose Rodriguez Jr. in 2005 that junking the tapes was legal. For the investigations opening into Rodriguez's actions by the House and Senate intelligence committee, that written advice will be key -- if it hasn't already been shredded.

It's unclear exactly which attorney from the Directorate of Operations (now called the National Clandestine Service) gave Rodriguez the go-ahead. A bevy of administration and intelligence officials have acknowledged that attorneys from the White House (including Harriet Miers), the Justice Department, and the CIA's general counsel advised against destroying the tapes. Interestingly, a clearly pro-Rodriguez ex-CIA official tells the Times that such advice was less than ironclad:

“They never told us, ‘Hell, no,’” he said. “If somebody had said, ‘You cannot destroy them,’ we would not have destroyed them.”

Behold another pivot point for the joint DOJ-CIA Inspector General inquiry and the Congressional probes: how clearly did the Bush administration warn the CIA against destroying the tapes? Did Rodriguez, faced with widespread administration opposition to the destruction of the tapes, simply keep asking for guidance until he found the legal advice he wanted? Or did the administration, including the CIA's own acting general counsel, John Rizzo, give equivocal, I-don't-want-to-know guidance?

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Add this to our list of legislators who knew about the CIA's recording of interrogations of al-Qaeda detainees: in September 2002 and again in 2003, the leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees were briefed on what goes on in those interrogations. That means ex-Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS), Sen. Richard Shelby, Sen. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Rep. Jane Harman (D-CA), and ex-Rep. Porter Goss (R-FL) knew about waterboarding prisoners like Abu Zubaydah, leader of al-Qaeda's military committee. Publicly, The Washington Post reports, they said nothing, because privately, they didn't object -- until waterboarding became public knowledge, and some of the lawmakers expressed outrage. But some are disputing that account, though they're not giving specifics. From the Post:

Individual lawmakers' recollections of the early briefings varied dramatically, but officials present during the meetings described the reaction as mostly quiet acquiescence, if not outright support. "Among those being briefed, there was a pretty full understanding of what the CIA was doing," said Goss, who chaired the House intelligence committee from 1997 to 2004 and then served as CIA director from 2004 to 2006. "And the reaction in the room was not just approval, but encouragement."

Congressional officials say the groups' ability to challenge the practices was hampered by strict rules of secrecy that prohibited them from being able to take notes or consult legal experts or members of their own staffs. And while various officials have described the briefings as detailed and graphic, it is unclear precisely what members were told about waterboarding and how it is conducted. Several officials familiar with the briefings also recalled that the meetings were marked by an atmosphere of deep concern about the possibility of an imminent terrorist attack.

"In fairness, the environment was different then because we were closer to Sept. 11 and people were still in a panic," said one U.S. official present during the early briefings. "But there was no objecting, no hand-wringing. The attitude was, 'We don't care what you do to those guys as long as you get the information you need to protect the American people.' "

That U.S. official is clearly engaging in pushback. The revelation that the CIA videotaped interrogations in 2002 and then destroyed their recordings in 2005 threatens to lead to the agency's nightmare scenario: prosecution for potential war crimes. On Saturday, the Justice Department, along with the CIA's inspector general, opened an investigation into the destruction. The agency wants to make clear that it thought it had legal cover from the White House and Justice Department in 2002 to torture detainees -- and political cover from the relevant leaders of the intelligence committees in Congress. On the former point, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales and then-Justice Department official John Yoo made sure of it. And on that latter point, it's clear from the Washington Post story that Congress did indeed sign on. As the investigations proceed, the agency will argue that they were not in this alone.

Bob Graham, who left the Senate in 2005, has said he has no recollection of the briefings. So that's one denial. Porter Goss, who became CIA Director in 2004, says all involved knew about the interrogations. Jay Rockefeller's story is complicated -- he began public objection to waterboarding in 2005 -- and is liable to change. Jane Harman says she won't discuss anything classified: a cynic might say that at least she's consistent. Pat Roberts didn't return my Friday phone call.

So what did Pelosi know? From the Post:

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Usually, what nails you in Washington malfeasance is the cover-up, not the crime. With the revelation that the CIA in 2005 destroyed videotapes of interrogations of senior al-Qaeda detainees, it'll be both.

Start with the facts as they're currently understood. In 2002, the CIA videotaped interrogations of Abu Zubaydah, the chief of al-Qaeda's military committee, and an as-yet-unknown colleague. (My guess is that Detainee #2 is Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who, following his capture that September in Pakistan, was the second most important detainee then in custody.) During that time, the tapes remained a closely-held secret, despite requests for information on interrogations from the 9/11 Commission, a 2002 joint Congressional inquiry into 9/11, and Judge Leonie Brinkema, who presided over the Zacharias Moussaoui trial. In 2005, then operations chief Jose Rodriguez ordered the tapes destroyed, without disclosing their existence to anyone who didn't already know. This week, The New York Times prepared a story about the tapes. To get out in front of it, Director Michael Hayden released a statement about both the tapes and their destruction.

Hayden makes not a single plausible claim about the tapes and why they were destroyed. He said in an internal message to CIA employees that the release of the tapes -- whether to the judge or to the inquiries or to, ultimately, the press -- would have allowed al-Qaeda to identify CIA interrogators and then target them for retribution. The appropriate response to that is: LOL. The CIA has the capacity to move its operatives around the world, including to places where there aren't any al-Qaeda "assassins" -- like, say, northern Virginia. To say otherwise, as Hayden does, is to tacitly concede that CIA is too incompetent to protect its people.

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We've been down this road before, first with the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act and then with this summer's executive order on interrogations. And, like water seeking its own level, each time the Bush administration faces some kind of legal obstacle to torturing terrorism detainees, it finds a way to circumvent it. Even so, Congress is prepared to pass yet another ban on CIA torture techniques, the AP reports.

House and Senate negotiators working on an intelligence bill have agreed to limit CIA interrogators to techniques approved by the military, which would effectively bar them from using such harsh methods as waterboarding, congressional aides said Wednesday.

Members of the House and Senate intelligence committees decided to include the ban while working out differences in their respective bills authorizing 2008 spending for intelligence programs, according to the aides, who spoke anonymously because the negotiations were private. Details of the bill are to be made public Thursday.

That will set the stage for another veto fight with President Bush, who last summer issued an executive ordered allowing the CIA to use "enhanced interrogation techniques" that go beyond what's allowed in the 2006 Army Field Manual.

The Army field manual is compliant with the Geneva Conventions, the Constitution, and the laws of the United States of America. Waterboarding and the other potentially-banned tortures are not. Three guesses on which the Bush administration will choose.

From a not-yet-online piece from Congressional Quarterly, the White House proclaims that torture, and only torture, can keep your children safe:

And White House spokesman Tony Fratto issued a statement saying, "if that provision is in the bill, it would make a bad bill worse. We had a veto message on a similar provision in the House's supplemental funding bill. The CIA program has provided valuable, actionable intelligence that has allowed us to find and capture terrorists and prevent attacks. Efforts to weaken this program are dangerous and misguided."

As the AP notes, CIA director Mike Hayden has (euphemistically) defended torturing detainees. Attorney General Michael Mukasey has pleaded ignorance on whether waterboarding is torture. In an interview with TPMmuckraker on Monday, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) pledged to press Mukasey on the legality of waterboarding every time Mukasey testifies to the Senate Judiciary Committee. With the White House spending more energy defending its God-given right to torture than it spends, say, finding Osama bin Laden, prepare to see this sorry spectacle again and again over the next fourteen months.

They're hard to keep straight, the various and sundry friends and business associates of Rudy Giuliani with legal problems. But here's one worth keeping an eye on: Hank Asher. ABC reports that Asher, a former drug-runner, as well as a business partner and "close friend" of Giuliani's, makes an appearance in the recent indictment of Orange County Sheriff Michael Carona on bribery charges.

Carona himself was once a rising star in the GOP, often mentioned as a potential candidate for lieutenant governor of California. Dubbed "America's Sheriff" by Larry King for how he handled the 2002 hunt for 5-year-old Samantha Runnion's kidnapper, he naturally endorsed America's Mayor Rudy Giuliani for president. According to news accounts, he's met Giuliani at least twice. He's also chums with Bernie Kerik.

The indictment alleges that Carona and five associates, including his wife (Deborah) and mistress (named Debra), accepted bribes and generally did what they could to get rich off Carona's position ($700,000 in bribes and kickbacks). Among the dozens of illicit gifts enumerated in the indictment is this one:

On or about December 19, 2002, defendant Deborah Carona and co-conspirator Jaramillo's wife [that's Carona's assistant Sheriff George Jaramillo] accepted as gifts from H.A., a businessman who owned a data mining software company, yellow gold and diamond Ladies Cartier Watches worth approximately $15,000 each.

"H.A.", according to ABC, is Hank Asher, who did indeed own a data mining software company called Seisint at the time (more about that later). Asher himself is worth "north of $700 million," based mostly on his success selling his data mining product, which is called Matrix (he's since sold it to LexisNexis). And yes, he did smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Florida aboard his private jet for eight months in 1980 and 1981. But he says he paid his dues by cooperating with federal agents to stop other runners.

But it sounds like Asher still likes to live large. During that same dinner meeting with the two wives at Carmine's here in New York, he apparently got a bit rambunctious:

When Hank Asher reached into the bag and pulled out the two $15,000 gold Cartier watches, the holiday crowd at Carmine's restaurant on 44th Street in Manhattan noticed, patrons recalled....

During the Carmine's dinner, when Asher's voice began to boom across the room, patrons recall him handing his black American Express card to the restaurant to pay for any inconvenience his boisterous party caused the other guests. He told the staff to buy everyone's dinners and drinks and then peeled off a few $100 bills to tip strolling carolers in the restaurant.

As ABC notes, Asher isn't named as a co-conspirator in the case, and "there is no allegation in the document that he attempted to influence any purchases or other decisions by the county." Maybe it was just a nice Christmas gift. But the timing is enough to raise eyebrows. Because that's when Asher was making a big push for law enforcement agencies to buy his product. Carona, famous as he was for tracking down child predators, would have been an asset to Asher, who was hawking a product designed to help authorities identify suspects by searching billions of public records. Carona and Asher would later serve together on the Board of Directors for the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children.

Certainly Asher had a broad strategy for selling his system. To help him sell to the federal government, his secret weapon was Rudy Giuliani, whom he'd hired for a staggering sum of money -- under a contract that the two of them kept secret for years. More about that in a bit.

Score another one for Wikileaks. This morning -- thanks to a source known only as "Peryton" -- the open-source website for whistleblower documents published the 2004 manual for U.S. military detention operations at Guantanamo Bay. You can read it, with commentary, here.

Last month, Wikileaks published the 2003 edition of the manual. Among other controversial provisions, the manual instructed officials to hide certain detainees from the International Committee of the Red Cross, a practice that the military repeatedly denied was in existence at Guantanamo. Spokespeople for the U.S. military's Southern Command, which oversees Guantanamo Bay, said the manual was outdated and assured that some instructions that violated the Geneva Conventions were no longer in effect.

It's unclear so far what portions of the 2004 manual remain in place. (Maybe Peryton will enlighten us in the future.) The Washington Post's Josh White quotes Guantanamo Bay spokesman as saying that "things have changed dramatically" at the camp since 2004. But Wikileaks finds that, in key areas, the 2004 manual didn't change so much from 2003:

Systematic denial of Red Cross access to prisoners remains. The use of dogs remains. Segregation and isolation are still used routinely and systematically – including an initial period of at least 4 weeks "to enhance and exploit the disorientation and disorganization felt by a newly arrived detainee", only terminated at the behest of interrogators. Both manuals assert that detainees will be treated in accordance with the "spirit" of the Geneva conventions "to the degree consistent with military needs", but never assert that the conventions are actually being followed at Guantanamo. Put into practice, neither manual complies with the Geneva conventions.

So is the past prologue? We'll find out. For now, though, dig into the 2004 manual and let us know in comments what you think is most significant.

It's easy to get distracted in our workaday lives and lose sight of the big picture.

For instance, Mike Allen of the Politico reports that the White House recently passed "an unusual landmark": the administration has produced 1 million documents to Congress since January. The mind can scarcely comprehend the horrors of such unbridled oversight.

The details of this "unusual landmark" are unclear. Characteristic of a White House that has successfully stonewalled a number of key Congressional investigations while still managing to complain about responding to inquiries, the provenance of that "1 million" number is unstated. (A Waxman aide "scoffed" at the number, Allen reports.) Presumably if you were to press for information as to where it had come from, it would prove an additional unreasonable burden. And as to whether that landmark (if it has been reached) is, in fact, "unusual," who knows? Certainly to a White House that suffered no oversight during its first six years, it is unusual.

Having staggered the mind with the "1 million" number, Allen quotes a "senior administration official" to drive home the real costs:

“There are a number of dry holes that got drilled,” a senior administration official said. “People don’t care about it. The public is saying: Gas is at $3 a gallon. Is there any energy bill? No.”

The official even made sport of the Democrats’ approach, calling it “purely reflexive.”

“People are having concerns with their mortgages,” the official said. “Is there a mortgage bill? No. We have a government to fund. Is there any appropriations bill? No.

“But, I’ve got a new subpoena for you today — and we’re going to hold somebody in contempt. Doesn’t that help you?”

The main effect, the official said, was a distraction for the staff and countless hours of work for the White House counsel’s office.

Accepting the undeniable logic of every new subpoena meaning one less sweeping piece of legislation, it staggers the mind to think of what the Democratic Congress could have accomplished these past 11 months if it had spent its time passing the administration's legislation instead of investigating it. Not only that, but there wouldn't have been the additional burden of having to replace officials forced to resign as the result of those investigations. Think how much more could get done!

Now, if only the press would lay off too, then they could really get some things accomplished.